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Abstract
Human Systems Integration (HSI) is the interdisciplinary technical and management processes
for integrating human considerations within and across all system elements. The goal of this
research is to develop a better understanding of how the costs of doing HSI work within a
program can be estimated. The research is divided into two parts.
In the first part, problem formulation, literature from several relevant domains is first reviewed.
Next a descriptive case study is conducted on the development of the Pratt and Whitney F 119
engine. It examines activities done to support HSI up to engineering and manufacturing
development and concludes that, among other factors, HSI in requirements are a major driver of
effort. This conclusion leads to work on the integration of HSI into the counting of requirements
for an existing systems engineering cost model.
In the second part of the research, implementation and validation, two workshops are conducted
to assess how HSI considerations are addressed in real-world requirements engineering. The
first workshop tests existing requirements counting guidelines, identifies weakness, and suggests
improvement. The second workshop applies the Wideband Delphi method to generate consensus
between stakeholders in order to deliver a quantitative estimate of HSI effort. The workshop
also demonstrates that stakeholders perceive functional and nonfunctional requirements as
driving effort in similar ways, a conclusion that challenges a widely-held belief that
nonfunctional requirements are less significant than functional ones.
The research done in the case study and workshops results in improvements to the existing
systems engineering cost model, and an application of the model is presented. Policy
considerations are discussed. The integration of the HSI into the model represents a significant
step toward being better able to plan HSI effort in acquisition programs.
Thesis Supervisors:
Ricardo Valerdi, Research Associate, Lean Advancement Initiative
Donna H. Rhodes, Senior Lecturer, Engineering Systems and Principal Research Scientist,
Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Marine Corps, Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation/Problem Statement
As systems become more complex and software-intensive, the practice of rigorous systems
engineering becomes more critical to program performance. The modem practice of systems
engineering spans both technical and social disciplines. At the same time, programs are under
constant pressure to reduce costs, conform to deadlines, and still deliver required performance.
The study of Human Factors has long been recognized as a critical component of enabling
system performance. Existing Human Factors engineering standards and best practices ensure
operators, maintainers, and others involved in the lifecycle of a system can interact effectively
with the system. However, as systems have become more complex, so have their relationships
with the people that interact with them.
Human Systems Integration (HSI) seeks to address the complexities of human considerations in
modem systems by integrating multiple human domains into systems engineering early in the
development lifecycle. HSI is defined as the "interdisciplinary technical and management
processes for integrating human considerations within and across all system elements; an
essential enabler to systems engineering practice" (International Council on Systems Engineering
2006).
Despite the prominence given to HSI in a number of policy documents, the National Academies,
in a 2007 report on HSI, identified "a lack of commitment by funders and program managers to
assign priority to [HSI]" as well as "a lack of effective communication between system engineers
and human-system domain experts" to be challenges inhibiting the practice of HSI (Pew and
Mavor 2007). As part of its conclusions, the report recommended further research in "estimating
the size of the HSI development effort" as a means of achieving "full integration of human
systems and systems engineering" (Pew and Mavor 2007).
1.2 Methodology and Methods
1.2.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis
Three research questions were developed from the motivation discussed above, and the research
sponsor's requirements. They are:
" R1: How can the "right" amount of effort to invest in HSI be determined?
" R2: How much does HSI effort cost?
" R3: What is the relationship between HSI and systems engineering?
The question of "how much does HSI effort cost?" results from the recommendations of the
National Academies report discussed in the previous section. Understanding how much HSI
costs within a program can help program managers to plan for HSI and avoid cutting funding for
HSI when other priorities arise. However, developing a single value or heuristic about the cost
of HSI does not tell the full story of HSI investment. Programs are under constant pressure to
reduce costs. HSI investment needs to be "right-sized," that is, enough HSI must be funded to
ensure human considerations are integrated into the system, but not so much that additional
funding achieves reduced marginal benefit. Therefore, research question RI asks "how can the
'right' amount of effort to invest in HSI be determined?" The research question "What is the
relationship between HSI and systems engineering" reflects the National Academies report
recommendation to explore communication between systems engineering and human-system
domain experts and to more fully integrate HSI with systems engineering. Understanding how
the relationship between the two disciplines will inform how cost estimates developed for HSI
can best be integrated with cost estimates developed for systems engineering.
An initial hypothesis was developed to test the research questions:
SH 1: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated as a function of total Systems
Engineering Effort.
Subsequent to literature reviews and a case study, a sub-hypothesis was developed to focus
implementation and validation work:
e H2: HSI effort can be estimated by counting "number of HSI-related requirements."
1.2.2 Method Selection and Thesis Structure
This thesis draws its research approach from two well-established fields: Human Factors and
systems engineering.
Human Factors is an applied science, meaning that it "relies on measurement of behavioral and
physical variables" - in particular, the observation of human subjects (Proctor and Van Zandt
2008). Observation in the context of the scientific is known as empiricism. Empirical research
provides observations that are used to evaluate "the truth value of alternative statements"
(Proctor and Van Zandt 2008).
The need for empirical research in systems engineering has been explored by (Valerdi and
Davidz 2009), who recommend using mixed methods as a means to gather enough data to
support assertions. Related work has shown that a majority of systems engineering researchers
use mixed methods (Valerdi, Liu et al. 2010). The methods used as part of mixed-methods
research may be part of an established discipline or may originate from varied disciplines. In the
domain of Human Factors research, method selection depends foremost on what observations of
human subjects can be made. Runkel and McGrath (1972) recommend different research
methods based on, among other factors, access to subjects. The framework they establish
(illustrated in Figure 1) was applied in the choosing of research methods in this thesis.
Controlled Settings
Laboratory Experimental
Experiments Simulations
Judgment Field
Tasks Experiments
Behavior Natural Settings
Setting-independent Sample Field Studies
Surveys
Formal Theo Compute
Simulations
No Observation of
Behavior
Figure 1. Framework for choosing research methods, adapted from (Runkel and McGrath 1972).
The work in this thesis was divided into two distinct parts: (1) problem formulation, and (2)
implementation and validation. Work done during problem formulation was exploratory in
nature. A review of relevant literature is discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes a
descriptive case study (the equivalent of a field study as described by Runkel and McGrath).
The case study explored the three research questions in order to refine the hypothesis and guide
follow-on work. Insights from the case study resulted in a sub-hypothesis.
The sub-hypothesis developed during problem formulation was tested through two workshops.
The workshops are described in Chapter 4, which summarizes implementation and validation
work. The experimental simulation method was applied during both workshops in order to
maximize the amount of empirical data that could be collected, while taking into account the
relatively small number of participants available and the lack of experimental control over
participants. Section 4.3 applies the conclusions made during implementation and validation to
an example cost modeling application.
Chapter 5 summarizes the research performed during both problem formulation and
implementation and validation and shows how the conclusions made contribute to understanding
of the research questions and hypotheses.
1.2.3 Related Work
This thesis draws from published work by the author. A list of relevant references can be found
in section 6.2. Portions of the text dealing with cost estimation and the COSYSMO model
(sections 2.3 and 3.3.1, in particular) draw from (Valerdi and Liu 2010), which in turn uses text
from (Valerdi 2008), with the original author's permission.
..........
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2 REVIEW OF RELEVANT Topics
This chapter presents a review of three topics relevant to the study of HSI: defense acquisition,
systems engineering, and cost estimation. The practice of HSI aims to integrate human
considerations into systems. Defense acquisition and systems engineering work in concert to
realize needed systems. The scope of the review is limited to a broad overview of the U.S.
Defense Acquisition System and the role of systems engineering within it, with a focus on how
each of these topics relates to HSI. The discussion of cost estimation informs the discussion of
existing approaches to HSI cost estimation, discussed in Chapter 3.
2.1 Defense Acquisition
Three key Decision Support Systems work together to support Defense Acquisition. The sum of
these processes is commonly referred to as "Big 'A' Acquisition" in order to distinguish the
overarching system from the Decision Support System known as "The Defense Acquisition
System", commonly known as "little 'a' acquisition" (Department of Defense 2010). Figure 2
shows visually how these terms are related.
The Defense Acquisition System and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) together encompass the majority of the policies, principles, and requirements for the
development of military systems. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Process deals with how resources are requested, allocated, and tracked within the Department of
Defense.
BIG "A" DEFENSE ACQUISITION
Figure 2. Big "A" Acquisition, adapted from (Defense Acquisition University 20 1Ob).
While defense acquisition policy is written to promote innovation and autonomy, programs must
be held accountable to requirements, budget, and schedule. Defense acquisition policy assigns a
single individual to each program who is held accountable for that program. The Program
Manager (PM) of a program "is the designated individual with responsibility for and authority to
accomplish program objectives for development, production, and sustainment to meet the user's
operational needs. The PM shall be accountable for credible cost, schedule, and performance
reporting" (Department of Defense 2003). The program manager must be familiar with
acquisition policy and works to ensure that his/her program meets the requirements of each of
the DoD's three Decision Support Systems. The two decision support systems most relevant to
HSI are The Defense Acquisition System and JCIDS. These two systems are further discussed in
the following sections.
2.1.1 The Defense Acquisition System
The U.S. Defense Acquisition System is defined as "the management process by which the [U.S.]
Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to users" and "exists
to manage the nation's investments in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to
achieve the National Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces"
(Department of Defense 2003).
(Proram
A B Initiation) 10C FOC
Material E afcbnd Pieduc-o W Operations
its DeploVanen support
Pre-Systems AcquisionAtion
Ox Decision Point &a Milestone Review a Decision Point If PDR Is not conducted before Milestone S
Figure 3. Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Department of Defense 2008a).
The operation of The Defense Acquisition System (illustrated in Figure 3) is defined by three
major milestones and five acquisition phases. The first phase, Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA)
exists to "assess potential materiel solutions" (Department of Defense 2008a). When the need
for a materiel solution is identified prior to MSA, an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is
performed during MSA to weigh the pros and cons of possible solutions. The MSA phase is
often referred to as "Pre-Milestone A" acquisition because it takes place prior to the major
review at Milestone A.
Once a program passes Milestone A Review, it enters the Technology Development (TD) phase
of acquisition. The purpose of the TD phase is to "reduce technology risk, [and] determine and
mature the appropriate set of technologies" (Department of Defense 2008a). Early prototypes of
the system may be developed during this phase, but in general the design and specifications of
the system will remain fluid as trades are made between attributes desired and resources
available. Taken together, the MSA and TD phases are known as "Pre-Systems Acquisition" or
"Pre- Milestone B" acquisition.
After a program passes Milestone B Review, it enters the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase of acquisition. Milestone B also marks "program initiation" because
all programs are required to have a program manager after Milestone B, but not necessarily
before. By the EMD phase, the requirements of the system should be finalized. The main goal
of the EMD phase is to "develop an affordable and executable manufacturing process" taking
into consideration systems integration issues including HSI, logistics, supportability, and
interoperability. Several types of testing and evaluation (T&E) also occur during EMD.
Although both EMD and its succeeding phase, Production and Deployment (PD), are considered
part of "Systems Acquisition" only prototypes can be produced during EMD. In addition, the
majority of funds for MSA, TD, and EMD all come from Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, whereas funds for PD come from Procurement money. The
Production and Deployment phase uses the plans developed during previous phases to produce
operational units, test initial production units, and then begin full-rate production once tests are
passed.
The final phase of acquisition is Operations and Support (O&S). Both O&S and PD are referred
to together as "Post-Milestone C" phases. The line between the two program phases is more
blurred than the phases that are separated by Milestone Reviews. The goal of PD is to provide
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) while the goal of O&S is to provide Full Operational
Capability (FOC). However, O&S for the first units produced must often begin before processes
that occur during Production and Deployment are complete.
2.1.2 The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
Many of the requirements that allow a program to move from one acquisition phase to the next
depend on the policies of JCIDS. This is because the documents that govern the Defense
Acquisition System (see section 2.1.1, above), known collectively as the DoD 5000 series of
publications, were developed to complement Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01G - Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Department of Defense
2003) (Department of Defense 2008a; CJCS 2009).
The JCIDS process begins with the establishment of user needs, expressed as capabilities desired.
A capability is defined as "the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and
conditions through combinations of means and ways across doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of
tasks to execute a specified course of action" (CJCS 2009).
Capability needs, gaps, and excesses are identified through a Capabilities Based Assessment
(CBA), which "may be initiated by any number of organizations, to include combatant
commands, Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs), [any of the Armed] Services, and Defense
Agencies" (CJCS 2009). CBAs must be linked to strategic security guidance documents such as
the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy,
among others (CJCS 2004; White House 2006) (Department of Defense 2008b). CBAs take
place prior to the MSA phase of acquisition and are considered a part of pre-systems acquisition
or pre-Milestone A acquisition. The graphic in Figure 4 shows the relationship between key
JCIDS documents and phases and milestones of The Defense Acquisition System.
Figure 4. Relationship between JCIDS and the Defense Acquisition System, adapted from (Air
Force Human Systems Integration Office 2009b).
CBAs essentially evaluate the need for a materiel solution. CBAs must consider changes to
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, policy, and facilities
(DOTMLPF) as means to satisfy capability gaps. When a need for a new program emerges, the
broad capabilities required of the new program are written into an Initial Capabilities Document
(ICD), which is then used to make the Materiel Development Decision (MDD).
Once the MDD has been made, the ICD is used during MSA and TD to refine capabilities
required of the system. The next major document produced after the ICD is the Capability
Development Document (CDD). CDDs are the "primary means of defining authoritative,
measurable, and testable capabilities needed by the warfighters" (CJCS 2009). Much of the
work that is performed during MSA and TD center around producing a CDD, and the CDD itself
guides the production of other key acquisition documents. A draft CDD is required by Milestone
A and a final CDD is required by Milestone B.
The final key JCIDS document, the Capability Production Document (CPD) is produced between
Milestone B and Milestone C, during the EMD Phase. CPDs emulate CDDs in both structure
and content, the key difference being that whereas CDDs guide the EMD phase of acquisition,
CPDs guide the Production & Deployment phase.
2.2 Systems Engineering
The previous sections describe the policies that govern defense acquisition. Systems engineers
are the engineers who work within Acquisition to realize systems. This section gives a brief
overview of systems engineering, explains the role of systems engineering within defense
acquisition, and explores the relationship between HSI and systems engineering.
2.2.1 Definitions and Practice
The practice of systems engineering can be traced back to the mid- 1 900s post-WWII era, when
systems became so complex that many projects began to fail along the lines of performance,
budget, and schedule (Ferris 2007). The discipline developed to address these issues by
considering systems holistically, viewing them as more than the sum of parts. The first book to
begin to define systems engineering was Goode and Machol's 'System Engineering: An
Introduction to the Design ofLarge-Scale Systems (1957). Since then, many systems
engineering standards and definitions have emerged. Some of the most significant are
summarized below.
1969: MIL-STD 499: "System engineering is the application of scientific and engineering efforts
to (a) transform an operational need into a description of system performance parameters and a
system configuration through the use of an iterative process of definition, synthesis, analysis,
design, test and evaluation..." (Department of Defense 1969)
1974: MIL-STD-499A: System Engineering is "A logical sequence of activities and decisions
transforming an operational need into a description of system performance parameters and a
preferred system configuration, (Department of Defense 1974).
1994: MIL-STD-499B: Systems Engineering is "an interdisciplinary approach encompassing the
entire technical effort to evolve and verify an integrated and life-cycle balanced set of system
people, product, and process solutions that satisfy customer needs"(Department of Defense
1994).
2005: IEEE 1220: "systems engineering is responsible for the total development effort necessary
to establish a product design that can be tested, manufactured, supported, operated, distributed,
and disposed of' (International Organization for Standardization 2005).
While these standards have helped to shape the practice of systems engineering, there is also a
larger question of whether the modem practice of systems engineering transcends traditional
definitions. Systems engineering has traditionally employed a set of systems engineering
technical processes and technical management processes. Systems engineering standards ISO
15288, Systems and Software Engineering-System Life Cycle Processes and ANSIIEIA 632
Processesfor Engineering a System define these processes (ANSI/EIA 1999; ISO/IEC 2002).
As systems have become more complex, the discipline of systems engineering has necessarily
begun to incorporate other relevant fields of study. Rhodes and Hastings argue, "The strongest
heritage of Systems Engineering comes from the aerospace and defense industries, and the
terminology and language of these industries tends to put artificial boundaries and constraints
around it as a discipline and practice" (2004).
The most recent definition of systems engineering put out by the International Council on
Systems Engineering (INCOSE) helps to bridge the gap between traditional and advanced
approaches to systems engineering. It defines systems engineering as an interdisciplinary
approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems," but also emphasizes
systems engineering's heritage, emphasizing - "defining customer needs and required
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with
design synthesis and system validation while considering the complete problem" (International
Council on Systems Engineering 2006).
2.2.2 Systems Engineering in Defense Acquisition
As discussed above, systems engineering has its strongest heritage in the defense domain; the
Department of Defense requires rigorous systems engineering practice at all levels within its
systems. Acquisition programs are required to be "managed through the application of a systems
engineering approach that optimizes total system performance and minimizes total ownership
costs" (Department of Defense 2003). More specifically, "Systems engineering provides the
integrating technical processes to define and balance system performance, cost, schedule, and
risk" (Department of Defense 2008a).
Systems engineering plays a role in both The Defense Acquisition System and in JCIDS (both
discussed in section 2.1). Every acquisition program is required to have a Systems Engineering
Plan (SEP) by Milestone A. The SEP documents "overall technical approach, including key
technical risks, processes, resources, metrics, and applicable performance incentives"
(Department of Defense 2008a).
Systems engineers facilitate the JCIDS process. They support the generation of the ICD, CDD,
and CPD. They develop system requirements and specifications from the CDD and CPD. They
ensure that stakeholder requirements are satisfied at multiple points along the lifecycle. Figure 5
sums up the key technical processes systems engineers execute in acquisition programs. The
takeaway from the figure is that systems engineering must be supported at every point within a
system's lifecycle in order for a system to be realized.
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Figure 5. Notional representation of systems engineering technical processes within the Defense
Acquisition Lifecycle (Defense Acquisition University 2010Oa).
2.3 Cost Estimation/Prediction Methodologies and Methods
Cost estimation helps program managers and systems engineers to plan their work, predict costs,
and better understand the scope of the systems they develop. Cost estimation is especially
important when developing systems of high complexity, cost and duration. The best guidance on
cost estimation techniques comes from organizations that have expertise in developing and
acquiring these classes of systems. Industry and government guidebooks provide a rich source
for best practices, lessons learned, tools and cost estimation processes (Department of Defense
1992; US Army Cost and Economomic Analysis Center 2002; International Society of
Parametric Analysts and Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis 2004; Air Force Cost Analysis
Agency 2008; National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2008; Government
Accountabiility Office 2009).
2.3.1 Analogy
The estimation by analogy method capitalizes on the institutional memory of an organization to
develop its estimates. This type of estimate is typically used when only one or very few
historical systems similar to the new system exist. The method works best when many
similarities between old and new systems exist, as in when a new system is developed using
components of previous systems.
Case studies are an instrument of estimation by analogy; they represent an inductive process,
whereby estimators and planners try to learn useful general lessons by extrapolation from
specific examples. They examine in detail elaborate studies describing the environmental
conditions and constraints that were present during the development of previous projects, the
technical and managerial decisions that were made, and the final successes or failures that
resulted. They then determine the underlying links between cause and effect that can be applied
in other contexts. Ideally, they look for cases describing projects similar to the project for which
they will be attempting to develop estimates and apply the rule of analogy that assumes previous
performance is an indicator of future performance. Well-documented cases studies from other
organizations doing similar kinds of work can also prove very useful so long as their differences
are identified.
2.3.2 Bottom-up/Activity-Based Costing
The bottom-up cost estimation approach begins with the lowest level cost component and rolls it
up to the highest level for its estimate. This method produces the most accurate estimates of cost
but also requires the most data and is the most labor-intensive to create. A bottom-up estimate of
a system's cost is created using costs reported from lower level components.
Lower level estimates are typically provided by the people who will be responsible for doing the
work. This work is usually represented in the form of a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS),
which makes this estimate easily justifiable because of its close relationship to the activities
required by the project elements. This can translate to a fairly accurate estimate at the lower
level. The disadvantages are that this process can place additional burden on workers and is
typically not uniform across entities. In addition, every level may be victim to a layer of
conservative management reserve which can result in an over estimate. The approach also
requires detailed cost and effort data from throughout the system, so the method cannot be used
early in the development cycle.
2.3.3 Expert Opinion
The expert opinion method simply involves querying experts in a specific domain and taking
their subjective opinion as an input. The obvious drawback to this technique is that the estimate
is only as good as the experts' opinions, which can vary greatly from person to person. Expert
opinion is not always included as a scientifically valid estimation method because estimates
generated using only expert opinion are the most difficult to justify and are typically only used
when no other methods are available.
The benefits of this method are that experts can provide a quick estimate with minimal
investment in the absence of empirical data. They can also account for other variables, such as
customer demands or technology availability that other approaches may overlook. Unfortunately,
many years of experience does not always translate into the right expertise. Moreover, since this
technique relies on human judgment, it has low reliability because even the most highly
competent experts can be wrong.
Expert opinion is most useful for confirming and informing other cost estimation methods. For
example, parametric models are often calibrated using a combination of expert opinion and
historical data. The analogy method is most effective when an expert determines how best to
map one system to another. The bottom-up approach depends on experts to conduct low-level
analyses of cost. A common technique for capturing expert opinion is the Delphi method which
was improved and renamed Wideband Delphi (Dalkey 1969; Boehm 1981). These methods
reduce natural human bias, improving the usefulness of data collected from experts.
2.3.4 Heuristics
Heuristic reasoning has been commonly used by engineers to arrive at quick answers to technical
problems. Practicing engineers, through education, experience, and examples, accumulate a
considerable body of contextual information. These experiences evolve into instinct or common
sense that is seldom recorded. These can be considered insights, lessons learned, common sense,
or rules of thumb, that are brought to bear in certain situations. In more precise terms, heuristics
are strategies using readily accessible, though loosely applicable, information to control
problem-solving in human beings and machines. Heuristics are common in psychology,
philosophy, law, and engineering. Systems engineering cost estimation heuristics and rules of
thumb have been developed by researchers and practitioners (Rechtin 1991; Boehm, Abts et al.
2000; Honour 2002) as shortcuts for decision making.
Ultimately, heuristics are based on experience and often provides valuable results. However,
they face the same shortfalls as expert opinion: heuristics based on past experiences may not
accurately describe changing environments and heuristics are only as good as the experiences
upon which they are built. As with expert opinion, heuristics are best used in combination with
other cost estimation techniques.
2.3.5 Top Down and Design to Cost
The top down or design to cost (DTC) technique is most typically used when budget restrictions
on a system are pre-defined and non-negotiable. It can be useful when a certain cost target must
be reached regardless of the technical features. However, the approach can often miss the low
level nuances that can emerge in large systems. It also lacks detailed breakdown of the
subcomponents that make up the system. It is up to managers and executives to constantly
ensure that standards or targets for cost set early during development are not exceeded.
In the defense acquisition community, the DTC philosophy is used to set cost targets and to
make program managers more cost-conscious early in the acquisition life cycle. The method can
also encompasses the use of incentives and/or awards to encourage achievement of specific
production or operation and support (O&S) cost goals (Gille 1988).
2.3.6 Parametric
The parametric cost estimation approach is the most sophisticated and most difficult to develop.
Parametric models generate cost estimates based on mathematical relationships between
independent variables (e.g., aircraft weight) and dependent variables (e.g., cost of materials). The
inputs characterize the nature of the work to be done, plus the environmental conditions under
which the work will be performed and delivered. The definition of the mathematical
relationships between the independent and dependent variables is at the heart of parametric
modeling. These relationships are known as Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) and are
usually based upon statistical analyses of large amounts of data. Regression models are used to
validate the CERs and operationalize them in linear or nonlinear equations. Developing CERs
requires a detailed understanding of the factors that affect the phenomenon being modeled, the
assumptions of the model in use, and the units of measure provided by the model.
The main advantage of using parametric models is that, once validated, they are fast and easy to
use. Parametric models do not require as much information as other methods, such as activity-
based costing and estimation by analogy, and can provide fairly accurate estimates. Parametric
models can also be tailored to a specific organization's CERs. However, some disadvantages of
parametric models are that they are difficult and time consuming to develop and require a
significant amount of clean, complete, and uncorrelated data to be properly validated.
Although many parametric models are referred to as cost models, they are actually effort models
since they are designed to provide an estimate of the human effort required to successfully
deliver a system. In the United States, the person-month unit is equivalent to 152 person-hours
as shown by the following logic. In one year there are 52 available work weeks. Subtract two
weeks for vacation, two weeks for holidays, one week for sick leave, and one week for training.
This leaves 46 weeks of available work. Assuming 40 hours per week, this results in:
(46 weeks / year) x (40 hours ! week) _ 153 hours! month
(12 months/ year)
Figure 2. Calculation of person-months
Rounded down to the nearest even number to make calculations easier and to capture the fact
there are other reasons - such as travel - that a person may not be able to work, the number that
is typically used is 152 hours. For some countries in Europe that follow a shorter work week, the
number of hours per person-month is 138, which means they assume that there are 36 hours of
available work time each week.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE F119 ENGINE
3.1 History and Practice of HSI
The study of human performance can be traced to at least as far back as the industrial revolution,
when technological advances and a need for greater efficiency drove research on how humans
could best interact with machines. At the time, these efforts were known as Industrial
Engineering. The challenges and requirements of industry leading up to the beginning of the 2 0 th
century grew significantly during the first and second World Wars. In response, the U.S. and
UK both funded efforts to understand human impacts on performance. Modem work in Human
Factors derives from the research done during this time period (Nemeth 2004).
HSI has its origins in the field of Human Factors, with which it is commonly confused. Human
Factors is "the study of those variables that influence the efficiency with which the human
performer can interact with the inanimate components of a system to accomplish the system
goals" (Proctor and Van Zandt 2008). Human Factors is also often understood to mean "the
scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other
elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data, and other methods
to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance" (International
Ergonomics Association 2010). This second definition emphasizes the role of Human Factors in
system performance and so overlaps with the definition of HSI (see section 1.1).
Human Factors is the field that HSI grew from and continues to be one of its central elements.
However, HSI as it is practiced expands upon Human Factors by incorporating a broader range
of human considerations over the system life cycle.
3.1.1 HSI in Defense Acquisition
General Maxwell R. Thurman of the U.S. Army is credited with first recognizing the need to
integrate Human Factors Engineering (HFE) with other human domains early in the weapons
system design process. In 1982, General Thurman directed that the Army's Human Factors
program be expanded to include Manpower, Personnel Capabilities, and Training issues. The
result was the U.S. Army Manpower and Personnel Integration Program (MANPRINT),
established in 1984; it continues to define the Army's HSI policy today (Booher 2003).
Army MANPRINT Navy HSI Branch Air Force HSI Office
Established 1984 Formalized 1997 Formalized 2007
7 Domains 8 Domains 9 Domains
Deputy Chief of Staff, CNO (N 15)1 Secretary of the Air
Army GI System Commands Force for Acquisition
(SAF/AQ)
Figure 6. Comparison of U.S. Military HSI programs (US Army MANPRINT Directorate 2007;
Air Force Human Systems Integration Office 2009a; Naval Sea Systems Command 2009).
Although the Army's MANPRINT program has existed since the early 1980s, HSI as a field
continues to mature. Figure 6 summarizes the HSI programs of the U.S. military branches (the
Marine Corps is represented within the Navy's HSI program). Due to HSI's multidisciplinary
nature, its stakeholders within each of the branches span departments and hierarchical structure.
The HSI programs in each of the services are responsible for policy guidance and for assessment
of programs, but specific design and analysis efforts in each of the domains is contracted to
military assets or private firms possessing those capabilities. Therefore, the differences in
organization of each of the HSI programs is not an indication of less emphasis put on a particular
domain, but rather reflect the differences in each branch's existing practices.
Aside from domain differences, the HSI programs in each of the military branches fit into their
larger organizational structures differently. The Army's MANPRINT program is part of Army
G- 1, the Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for Manpower and Personnel. The "Director,
Training and Education Division (OPNAV (N 15)) serves as the Navy's HSI and human
performance advocate, and the Navy's single governance authority for HSI policy" (Chief of
Naval Operations 2009). The Navy is unique in that its systems are acquired by each of the
Navy Systems Commands, which report to the Secretary of the Navy. Each system command
therefore also has its own HSI requirements division. The Air Force mandates addressing HSI
concerns in all capabilities-based development documents in Air Force Instruction 10-601. The
Air Force defines HSI as "a comprehensive management and technical approach for addressing
the human element in weapon system development and acquisition" (Department of the Air
Force 2006). The Air Force HSI Office serves as the policy arm of Air Force HSI and is
currently part of the Secretary of Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ). The "promotion,
guidance, consultation, and implementation of HSI" in the Air Forces is the responsibility of the
Human Performance Integration Directorate, 711th Human Performance Wing (Department of
the Air Force 2010).
The domains of HSI and their definitions recognized by INCOSE and adopted by the Air Force
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Domains of human systems integration (International Council on Systems Engineering
2006).
Manpower The number and mix of personnel (military, civilian, and contractor)
authorized and available to train, operate, maintain, and support each
system.
Personnel The human aptitudes, skills, and knowledge, experience levels, and
abilities required to operate, maintain, and support a system at the time it
is fielded.
Training The instruction and resources required providing personnel with requisite
knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly operate, maintain, and support
a system.
Environment In the context of HSI, environment includes the conditions in and around
the system and the concepts of operation that affect the human's ability to
function as a part of the system as well as the requirements necessary to
protect the system from the environment (e.g., radiation, temperature,
acceleration forces, all-weather ops, day-night ops, laser exposure, air
quality within and around the system, etc.).
Safety The application of systems engineering and systems management in
conducting hazard, safety and risk analysis in system design and
development to ensure that all systems, subsystems, and their interfaces
operate effectively, without sustaining failures or jeopardizing the safety
and health of operators, maintainers and the system mission.
Occupational The consideration of design features that minimize risk of injury, acute
Health and/or chronic illness, or disability, and/or reduce job performance of
personnel who operate, maintain, or support the system.
Habitability Factors of living and working conditions that are necessary to sustain the
morale, safety, health, and comfort of the user population that contribute
directly to personnel effectiveness and mission accomplishment, and
often preclude recruitment and retention problems.
Survivability The ability of a system, including its operators, maintainers and sustainers
to withstand the risk of damage, injury, loss of mission capability or
destruction.
Human The comprehensive integration of human capabilities and limitations
Factors (cognitive, physical, sensory, and team dynamic) into systems design, to
Engineering optimize human interfaces to facilitate human performance in training
operation, maintenance, support and sustainment of a system."
3.1.2 HSI Best Practices
In 2003, the Handbook ofHuman Systems Integration combined many of the lessons learned
from Hal Booher's 1997 case studies on Army Human Factors Integration (HFI) with the
experience of other researchers in the field. The result was a set of ten "principles" described as
"crucial to effective HSI" (Booher 2003). These principles are show in Table 2.
Landsburg et al. (2008) performed their own case studies on mostly non-military examples of
HSI from the Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration and the U.S.
Coast Guard. They derived an 11-step "guide" to HSI best practice, based on the U.S. Navy's
HSI practices. They also created a prioritized list of elements critical to HSI success,
summarized in Table 2. Landsburg et al. concluded that the transportation organizations studied
would have benefitted from the implementation of a top-level HSI program modeled after the
Navy's HSI program.
Booher (2003) consolidated detailed analyses of complex Army systems to create a direct link
between HFI investment and cost savings. Landsburg et al. (2008) chose instead to focus on a
few isolated HSI successes and then develop recommendations from the practice of HSI in Navy
acquisitions.
Table 2. Contributors to HSI success.
The 10 Principles of Effective HSI (Booher Prioritized List of Critical Elements for
2003) Successful HSI (Landsburg, Avery et al. 2008)
Top-level leadership Management and Organizational
Commitment
Focus on human-centered design (HCD) User/stakeholder involvement
Source selection policy Education and awareness of all
Organizational integration of all HSI HSI process ownership
domains
Documentation integration into procurement Holistic, enabled view
process
Quantification of human parameters Funding support
HSI technology Documented and technically sound
processes
Test and evaluation/assessments Qualified personnel
Highly qualified practitioners Open collaborative environment
Education and training program Practical applications based on sound Human
Factors research
3.1.3 HSI in the context of Systems Engineering
Systems engineering standards have long recognized the role of the human in the system. Two
approaches toward the integration of humans and systems currently exist in the literature. There
is the argument that systems engineering "does not focus on the human component" -instead
these issues are "the domain of the Human Factors specialist" (Proctor and Van Zandt 2008).
However, recent policies on systems engineering tend to incorporate human considerations into
existing practices. For example, IEEE Standard 1220, Systems engineering - Application and
management of the systems engineering process states "complex components represent system
elements that are composed of hardware, software, and/or humans" and "the human elements are
integral to the systems hierarchy and may be present at any level" (International Organization for
Standardization 2005). The INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook states: HSI is "an
essential enabler to systems engineering practice as it promotes a "total system" approach which
includes humans, technology (hardware, software), the operational context and the necessary
interfaces between and among the elements to make them all work in harmony."
These documents do not explicitly highlight the differences between the practice of Human
Factors and HSI. The distinction can be unclear and the roles of the two disciplines often
overlap. Well-established policies and practices guide the work of Human Factors engineers: see,
for example, (Proctor and Van Zandt 2008) and (Department of Defense 1989). Much less work
has been done to isolate and identify the tasks or processes that make up HSI effort. Malone and
Carson (2003) argue that "the primary objective of HSI in system acquisition is to influence
design with requirements and constraints associated with human performance and
accommodation" and suggest the following initiatives to achieve that objective:
* identify human performance issues and concerns early in system acquisition;
e define the roles of humans in system operations and maintenance early in system
development;
e identify deficiencies and lessons learned in baseline comparison systems;
e apply simulation and prototyping early in system design to develop and assess HSI
concepts;
e optimize system manning, training, safety, survivability, and quality of life;
* apply human-centered design; and
e apply human-centered test and evaluation.
While no one set of processes defines systems engineering, one set laid out in ANSI/EIA 632,
Processesfor engineering a system helps to illustrate the link between HSI and systems
engineering (ANSI/EIA 1999). The work breakdown structure in Table 3 can be related to the
higher level HSI initiatives above. For instance, the first initiative involving human performance
issues and concerns early in the life cycle can be carried out by a number of detailed activities
listed in Table 3: technical plans, system technical requirements, implementation, and transition
to use. Parallels can be drawn between the recommendations of Malone and Carson and each of
the fundamental processes of the systems engineering work breakdown structure - starting with
acquisition and supply and continuing through test and evaluation. Likewise, the systems
engineer should stay aware of HSI considerations throughout the entire system lifecycle.
Table 3. Systems engineering activities (ANSI/EIA 1999)
Fundamental Process Activities
Processes Categories
Acquisition Supply Process (1) Product Supply
and Supply Acquisition Process (2) Product Acquisition,
(3) Supplier Performance
Planning Process (4) Process Implementation Strategy,
(5) Technical Effort Definition,
(6) Schedule and Organization,
(7) Technical Plans,
(8) Work Directives
Tangeni Assessment (9) Progress Against Plans and
Process Schedules,
(10) Progress Against Requirements,
(11) Technical Reviews
Control Process (12) Outcomes Management,
(13) Information Dissemination
Requirements (14) Acquirer Requirements,
Definition Process (15) Other Stakeholder Requirements,
System (16) System Technical Requirements
Design Solution (17) Logical Solution Representations,
Definition Process (18) Physical Solution Representations,
(19) Specified Requirements
Implementation (20) Implementation
Product Process
Realization Transition to Use (21) Transition to use
Process
Systems Analysis (22) Effectiveness Analysis,
Process (23) Tradeoff Analysis,
(24) Risk Analysis
Requirements (25) Requirement Statements Validation,
Validation Process (26) Acquirer Requirements,
Technical (27) Other Stakeholder Requirements,
Evaluation (28) System Technical Requirements,(29) Logical Solution Representations
System (30) Design Solution Verification,
Verification (31) End Product Verification,
Process (32) Enabling Product Readiness
End Products (33) End products validation
Validation Process
3.1.4 HSI and Cost Estimation
Whereas this thesis asks what the "right" amount of HSI is for a system, previous work has
largely focused on specific activities and related cost savings.
Harold Booher's 1997 Human Factors Integration: Cost of and Performance Benefits to Army
Systems examines four Army systems and the impacts of Human Factors Integration (HFI), a
term often used interchangeably with HSI. The case studies provide an assessment of costs that
were avoided due to HFI considerations throughout the development process. Some costs were
estimated using historical data on mishaps and occupational health impacts. Other data were
generated using models that simulated the effects of system use on humans. At the time, the
leading model was a software package called Hardware vs. Manpower, known by its shorthand
of HARDMAN III (Booher 1997). HARDMAN III could assign specific tasks to simulated
crewmembers and calculate the effort placed on each. The program could then make a
recommendation as to the optimal crew size of a system. Today's incarnation of HARDMAN is
the Improved Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT), a model developed by the U.S.
Army Research Laboratory for use across the DoD. The four case studies performed in 1997
showed how HFI and MANPRINT had improved Army systems and resulted in significant cost
avoidance. The analysis focused on modeling techniques that were applied early in the
development process and estimated costs avoided using historical data.
Booher's case studies are summarized in Cost Arguments and Evidencefor Human Factors
Integration, produced on behalf of the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense (MoD) (Ministry
of Defence 2006). The booklet explores the costs and benefits of HSI work, citing many specific
examples. Sager and Grier (2005) also document a number of case studies from the domains of
usability, training, and HFE as examples of the costs and benefits of doing HSI.
While most literature has focused on the costs and benefits or return-on-investment (ROI) of HSI,
the work of this thesis focuses specifically on predicting necessary investment. Currently,
budgeting for HSI in defense acquisition programs is assigned based on particular HSI activities
expected to be performed during development. For example, budget may be set aside for
iterative safety analyses or crewmember workload simulations, but budget is rarely designated
for "HSI" in general. Varying sources have estimated different values of HSI investment as a
fraction of development costs. Some heuristics include "from 0 to 8% of design costs" (Booher
1990) and "between 0.5% and 6% of developmental costs" (Hewitt 2003).
A review of common cost estimation approaches can be found in section 2.3. Sager and Grier
(2005) suggest that two approaches can used to estimate Human Factors costs: "(1) By drawing
analogies to similar situations, either via case studies or personal experience; and/or (2) by
applying expert judgment to identify, for example, likelihood and impact of risk events." The
UK MoD's Cost-Benefit Analysis for Human Factors Integration: A Practical Guide suggests
three methods for estimating HFI (or HSI) costs:
1. As a percentage of project budget.
2. Breaking down the budget into components.
3. Parametric approach, based on number of studies needed (Bruseberg 2009).
Methods (1) and (2) apply a mixed heuristic- and expert-opinion-based approach: costs are
estimated as a function of total development costs and weights are then applied by domain
experts. Method (3) applies a parametric approach, but takes as an input "number of studies
needed," which itself is determined by a combination of heuristics and expert opinion.
The Federal Aviation Administration's Human Factors Assessments in Investment Analysis.:
Definition and Process Summaryfor Cost, Risk, and Benefit takes a novel approach to estimating
HSI effort. It suggests a number of "macroscopic cost drivers" that can be used early in a
system's development to estimate Human Factors costs:
1. Definition of and Agreement on System Requirements.
2. The complexity of the human-system integration.
3. Organizational culture and nature of relationships among management, user, and provider
unions, industry, and other stakeholders (e.g., interests converge or negotiations are
necessary).
4. Pace of program (e.g., aggressive, normal, slow).
5. Safety and security considerations (e.g., higher security, or normal security).
6. Collaboration with international, external, or domestic organizations for standardization
and other reasons (Hewitt 2003).
The cost estimation approaches discussed above suffer from two major shortfalls:
(1) They mostly pertain to the practice of Human Factors and do not give specific consideration
of HSI. Existing cost estimation approaches rely on experts being able to either assess Human
Factors risks and consequences or assess the number of Human Factors studies that will be
required within system development. HSI encompasses many human-related domains. As
shown in section 3.1.1, HSI domains can change by organization. It is therefore unlikely that
any expert or group of experts would be able to accurately estimate a sufficient amount of HSI
risks or studies needed to produce a credible cost estimate.
(2) They rely on the fact that heuristics or experts in HSI exist in the organizations where the
estimation is to take place. Heuristics and expert opinion are certainly useful methods of cost
estimation, but they should be used only when conditions support their application. The problem
of finding credible HSI experts has just been discussed. Heuristics face a similar challenge to
credibility. Heuristics are created through years of experience or are created using large data sets
showing causal relationships. The problem of experience relates to the problem with identifying
a true HSI "expert": very few people can be expected to possess the experience necessary to
make effort predictions relevant to every domain of HSI. None of the cost estimation approaches
above have performed sufficient analyses to establish a useful heuristic for HSI.
The next section describes a case study conducted to explore the research questions and gain
insight into how cost estimation approaches for HSI could be developed.
3.2 Case Study
3.2.1 Case Study Methodology
This case study documents HSI activities during the development of Pratt & Whitney's F 119
engine, which powers the $143 million Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft. The F-22
raptor fulfils the air superiority role in the Air Force by using a package of technologies to allow
pilots to "track, identify, shoot and kill air-to-air threats before being detected" (Department of
the Air Force 2009). Although the Air Force HSI Office was not formalized until 2007, much of
the work done on the F-22 and F 119 in the 1980s and 1990s spans the domains of HSI, making
the F 119 a best practice of HSI in the Air Force.
The design of the study was based on Yin's (2009) approach for identifying five important
components to case study design: (1) a study's questions; (2) its proposition; (3) its units of
analysis; (4) the logic linking the data to the propositions; and (5) the criteria for interpreting the
findings.
Study Questions: The overarching goal of the case study was to document a best practice of HSI
in the Air Force, with the hope that insights gained would inform subsequent research objectives.
As a result, the case study would best be categorized as a descriptive case study.
The three research questions discussed in section 1.2.1 were used to guide the execution of the
case study:
" R1: How can the "right" amount of effort to invest in HSI be determined?
e R2: How much does HSI effort cost?
" R3: What is the relationship between HSI and systems engineering?
The hypothesis of this thesis is that HSI effort can be measured as a function of systems
engineering effort. The first approach to interpreting this hypothesis was that a quantitative
heuristic could be identified relating HSI effort to systems engineering effort - for example,
"HSI cost should always be between 20-25% of systems engineering costs." This case study
sought to isolate HSI costs from systems engineering costs in order to establish such a
relationship. The following proposition was therefore developed:
Proposition: HSI effort can be isolated from the larger systems engineering effort spent. If a
quantitative relationship between HSI cost and systems engineering cost could be documented, it
would represent a data point useful in the development of a cost model.
Units of Analysis: The unit of analysis was the development of the F 119, from concept
development until major engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). The case study
focused primarily on work done by Pratt & Whitney, though it became apparent during the case
study that interaction with the Air Force was also of importance.
Logic Linking Data to Propositions: No historical data on specific costs associated with HSI
activities were available either because data were not kept or the records could not be found.
Instead, the case study depended on Pratt & Whitney employees familiar with the F 119 to build
an understanding of its development. Interviews were conducted with Pratt & Whitney
engineers who were active in the development of the F 119, in both technical and management
roles. Interviews were also conducted with Air Force personnel familiar with the development
and maintenance of the F 119. Interviews were supplanted with existing literature.
Criteria for Interpreting Findings: The findings of descriptive case studies can be difficult to
present and interpret. What data is available may be too sparse to draw statistically significant
conclusions from. Yin (2009) recommends identifying rival propositions and linking evidence
gathered to one or the other. The rival propositions in this case study are:
Proposition: HSI effort could be isolated from the larger systems engineering effort spent.
Rival: HSI effort could not be isolated from the larger systems engineering effort spent.
These propositions are addressed again at the conclusion of the case study.
3.2.2 Early Air Force Emphasis on Reliability and Maintainability
The Defense Resources Board approved the creation of the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF)
program in November of 1981 to create a military jet that would be able to guarantee air
superiority against the Soviet Union. This fighter was meant to replace the F-15 Eagle, which
had previously filled this role. A team composed of Lockheed, Boeing, and General Dynamics
competed against Northrop Grumman to develop the fighter. In 1991, the ATF contract was
awarded to the Lockheed team's F-22, powered by Pratt & Whitney's F 119 engine (Figure 7).
Then Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice noted that an important consideration in the
awarding of the contract was the fact that the F-22's engines offered superior reliability and
maintainability (Bolkcom 2007).
Figure 7. PW F 119 engine cutaway (Pratt and Whitney 2002).
The Air Force placed an emphasis on reliability and maintainability from the beginning of the
ATF program as well as throughout the Joint Advanced Fighter Engine program (JAFE) - the
program to develop the engine for the ATF. In June of 1983, four general officers representing
the Army, Navy, and Air Force signed a joint agreement in order to "emphasize to the DoD and
defense contractor communities the critical importance of improving operational system
availability by making weapon system readiness and support enhancement high priority areas for
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all our research and development activities" (Keith, Williams et al. 1983). Later that year, the
director of the JAFE program sent a memorandum to participants in the program, including Pratt
& Whitney, asking them to consider that over 50 percent of Air Force budget was then devoted
to logistics, and that the problem would only worsen (Reynolds 1983).
To address this increase in logistics cost and determine ways to develop creative solutions, the
Air Force created the Reliability, Maintainability & Sustainability (RM&S) program in 1984
(Gillette 1994). Besides reducing life cycle cost, the RM&S program also sought to address the
reliability and durability problems that had plagued Pratt & Whitney's previous F 100 engine,
which powered the Air Force's F-15 Eagle. Developed in the 1970s, the F-15 was developed
specifically to counter the Russian MiG-25. Therefore, emphasis was placed on performance
during the development of both the F-15 and F 100. Unfortunately, the high performance of the
F100 meant that the engine was more prone to failure and downtime. By the 1980s, the Russian
air superiority threat was no longer as pressing as when the F-15 was developed and
supportability was emphasized over performance. As a result, the Air Force wanted improved
RM&S not only on the F 119 engine, but on development of the F-22 as a whole. Specific
supportability goals for the F-22 were announced as early as 1983 (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al.
1998).
3.2.3 Understanding Customer Needs
The F-22 engine competition was not the only instance in which Pratt & Whitney had competed
with General Electric. Both companies had developed engines to power the Air Force's F-16
Fighting Falcon. In the end, GE provided the majority of engines for that platform. Pratt &
Whitney saw success in the JAFE program as critical to the company's ability to continue to
compete in the military engine market. For the F 119 engine, Pratt & Whitney decided not only
to meet the Air Force's RM&S requirements, but to emphasize designing for the maintainer
throughout all aspects of the program. The company's approach exemplified the best practices
of what is now known as HSI.
Pratt & Whitney conducted approximately 200 trade studies as contracted deliverables for the
Air Force. Pratt & Whitney engineers also estimated they had conducted thousands of informal
trade studies for internal use. These trade studies used evaluation criteria, including safety;
supportability; reliability; maintainability; operability; stability; and manpower, personnel, and
training (Deskin and Yankel 2002).
Figures of merit were developed for the trade studies to define a consistent set of criteria upon
which to assess the trade studies. Pratt & Whitney engineers used these figures of merit to
determine which engineering groups would participate in each trade study.
As is often the case in the development of complex defense systems, responsibilities for the
various domains of HSI were distributed among many different organizations at Pratt & Whitney.
Of the nine domains of HSI (see Table 1 in section 3.1.1), seven were represented in Pratt &
Whitney's engineering groups. Maintainability, Survivability, Safety, Training, and Materials
were all engineering groups at Pratt & Whitney. Manpower, Personnel, and HFE were taken into
account by the Maintainability group. HFE also impacted the Safety group. Occupational
Health was considered by both the Safety group and Materials group, which dealt with hazardous
materials as one of its responsibilities. While there was an Environmental Health and Safety
(EH&S) group at Pratt & Whitney, it dealt with EH&S within the organization itself and did not
impact engine design. Habitability was not an important consideration in the engine design.
3.2.4 Top-Level Leadership and Integrated Product Development
The major requirements for RM&S came directly from the Air Force. The JAFE program in
particular was intended to improve RM&S by "reducing the parts count, eliminating
maintenance nuisances such as safety wire, reducing special-use tools, using common fasteners,
improving durability, improving diagnostics, etc" (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al. 1998). While
General Electric made significant RM&S improvements to its F120 engine during this time
period, Pratt & Whitney centered its competitive strategy on RM&S superiority.
During the Joint Advanced Fighter Engine competition, Pratt & Whitney participated in the Air
Force's "Blue Two" program. The name refers to the involvement of maintenance workers in
the Air Force - "blue-suiters". The program brought Pratt & Whitney engineers to Air Force
maintenance facilities so that the engine designers could experience first-hand the challenges
created for maintainers by their designs. Maintainers showed how tools were poorly designed,
manuals had unclear instructions, and jobs supposedly meant for one person took two or more to
complete safely.
Many of the features for which the F 119 would come to be praised were a result of leadership
commitment to HSI. Frank Gillette, the Chief Engineer of the F 119, served in various leadership
positions on the F119 project, eventually leading a team of over 900 engineers. In interviews
with Pratt & Whitney employees familiar with the F 119, Gillette was identified as a driving force
behind ensuring buy-in to HSI principles.
When the Pratt & Whitney team returned from its Blue Two experience to work on the F 119,
Gillette captured the lessons learned from the site visits in a series of presentations. These
presentations were then shown to every engineer on the F 119 team. Gillette also established
design ground rules based on the requirements of the maintainer.
One of the most important requirements for the F 119 was that only five hand tools should be
used to service the entire engine. All Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) would have to be "one-
deep", meaning that the engine would have to be serviceable without removal of any other LRUs,
and each LRU would have to be removable using a single tool within a 20-minute window
(Gillette 1994). Maintenance would have to be possible while wearing hazardous environment
protection clothing. Maintenance tasks would have to accommodate the heights of maintainers
from the 5th percentile female to the 95th percentile male. In addition:
"Built-in test and diagnostics were integrated with the aircraft support system,
eliminating the need for a special engine support system. Lockwire was
eliminated, and torque wrenches were no longer required for "B" nut
installations. The engine was designed with built-in threadless borescope ports,
axially split cases, oil sight gauges, and integrated diagnostics. Other
improvements were a modular design..., color-coded harnesses, interchangeable
components, quick disconnects, automated integrated maintenance system, no
component rigging, no trim required, computer-based training, electronic
technical orders, and foreign object damage and corrosion resistant. These
advances were intended to reduce operational level and intermediate level
maintenance items by 75% and depot level tools by 60%, with a 40% reduction in
average tool weight " (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al. 1998).
These innovations were only possible using the Integrated Product Development (IPD) concept.
Whereas on previous projects, engineering groups at Pratt & Whitney each worked in their own
respective disciplines, under IPD, teams of engineers from varying disciplines were able to
provide design engineers with the perspectives they needed to see the full impacts of their design
decisions.
3.2.5 Continuing Accountability and Enforcement of HSI
Adoption of the IPD concept brought various stakeholders together early in the design process
and ensured multidisciplinary input through design and development. As a matter of policy,
whenever a design change needed to be made, the originating group would submit the change to
be reviewed by a Configuration Control Board (CCB). CCBs were composed of senior
engineers from multiple engineering groups. At CCB meetings, each group with a stake in a
particular design change would explain the impacts of that change to the chair of the CCB,
typically a design engineer. The chair would then weigh the different considerations of the
design change and either approve/disapprove the change or recommend further analysis be done.
In instances when Air Force requirements needed to be changed, the originating group would
submit a Component Integration Change Request (CICR), which would then be internally
debated much as with design changes. CICRs were typically initiated when it was determined
that a particular requirement might not be in the best interests of the customer or when one
requirement conflicted with another. Once a CICR was finalized internally by all of Pratt &
Whitney's engineering groups, it was presented to the Air Force, which would then make the
final decision on whether a requirement could be eliminated, modified, or waived.
The processes for design and requirement change ensured that the work of one group did not
create unforeseen problems for another. However, change requests were typically made in
response to problems that arose during development. Although reacting to and fixing these
problems were important, it took proactive leadership to make sure HSI principles were being
followed even when no problems were apparent.
Frank Gillette created several policies that ensured engineers kept RM&S considerations
constantly in mind. All part design drawings were required to be annotated with the tools needed
to service that part. This helped to achieve the goal of being able to ser-vice the entire engine
with only five hand tools (in the end, the F 119 required five two-sided hand tools and one other
tool, sometimes described as 11 tools total).
Gillette also insisted on the development of several full-scale mock-ups of the F 119. These
mock-ups came at a considerable cost (over $2 million each, while the cost of an engine was then
about $7 million) but allowed engineers to see whether their designs had really achieved
maintainability goals. Engineers were asked to service LRUs on the mock-ups by hand to ensure
that they were each indeed only "one-deep". When an LRU was shown to not meet that
requirement, the teams responsible for those LRUs were asked to redesign them.
3.2.6 HSI Efforts Contribute to Competition Success
Leading up to the major EMD contracts awarded in 1991, Pratt & Whitney conducted 400
distinct demonstrations of the Fl 19's RM&S features. The F 119 also accrued over 110,000
hours of component tests and 3,000 hours of full-up engine tests, representing a thirtyfold
increase in total test hours over its predecessor, the F100 (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al. 1998).
Pratt & Whitney was willing to spend significant effort on demonstrating the Fl 19's RM&S
features because the company had recently been beat out by GE in their competition to provide
engines for the Air Force's F- 16 Fighting Falcon and therefore saw the Joint Advanced Fighter
Engine competition as its last chance to stay in the military engine market.
In 1991, both Pratt & Whitney and General Electric were awarded contracts worth $290 million
to complete the EMD phase of competition. The companies were given independence as to the
number and types of tests that would be run on their engines, while the Air Force provided safety
oversight. As a result, Pratt & Whitney chose to log about 50 percent more test hours than
General Electric (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al. 1998).
GE chose to emphasize the performance of its F120 engine over RM&S, though the F120 did
meet the Air Force's RM&S requirements. The F120 was the world's first flyable variable cycle
engine (Hasselrot and Montgomerie 2005). This meant that the F120 was able to change from
turbofan to turbojet configuration to achieve maximum performance in multiple flight situations.
The F120 was tested in both Lockheed's YF-22 and Northrop Grumman's YF-23 prototypes,
demonstrating better maximum speed and supercruise than Pratt & Whitney's F 119 in both
cases(Aronstein, Hirschberg et al. 1998). The dry weight of the F 119 is classified, making it
impossible to calculate its exact thrust-to-weight ratio. However, Pratt & Whitney advertises the
F1 19 as a 35,000 lb thrust class engine, putting it into the same thrust class as the F120 (Gunston
2007).
Despite the F120's superior performance in the air and higher thrust-to-weight ratio, on April 23,
1991, the Air Force chose the combination of Pratt & Whitney's F 119 and Lockheed's YF-22 to
be developed into the F-22. Pratt & Whitney had repeatedly demonstrated a better understanding
of the Air Force's RM&S needs, investing more time and money into demonstrations and
internal efforts than its competitor. It also avoided the increased risk of developing a variable
cycle engine, at the time considered a relatively new and untested technology. By 1991, the Air
Force's RM&S program was less focused on reducing downtime and more concerned with
reducing life cycle costs. Pratt & Whitney had presented a management plan and development
schedule that the Air Force considered sensitive to their needs (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al.
1998). On August 2, 1991, contracts worth $11 billion were awarded to Lockheed and Pratt &
Whitney (Bolkcom 2007) demonstrating the Air Force's commitment to HSI. Pratt & Whitney's
portion was worth $1.375 billion alone (Aronstein, Hirschberg et al. 1998).
3.2.7 Key HSI Success Factors
The Air Force's early and continuing emphasis on RM&S was captured via requirements.
Although dating back to 2003 the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government
Accountability Office) was still advocating for more equal consideration of reliability and
maintainability in requirements definition (General Accounting Office 2003), this case study
showed that the Air Force had already understood this principle a decade prior. The Air Force's
initial guidance to emphasize RM&S shaped the design approach of all of its contractors.
The actions of both the Air Force and Pratt & Whitney were examples of combining top-level
leadership's role with sound systems engineering practices. From a systems engineering
standpoint, the Air Force set formal requirements and expected deliverable trade studies based on
HSI concerns. In terms of leadership, the Air Force set early supportability goals, distributed
memoranda explaining their intent, and funded programs to show Pratt & Whitney engineers
actual maintenance conditions. For systems engineering, Pratt & Whitney embraced the IPD
approach along with IPD's subordinate systems engineering processes. The company made sure
to include diverse engineering groups on all major design and configuration changes, a practice it
continues to today. In terms of leadership, Pratt & Whitney invested significant effort to develop
mock-ups, conduct extra testing, and hold engineers accountable for RM&S standards, all of
which led to HSI success. These combined efforts of customer and contractor to define clear
requirements and communicate common expectations led to product success.
The efforts described above can be summarized into several key success factors:
1. Air Force policy to elevate visibility of HSI early in development.
2. Pratt & Whitney's adoption of the Integrated Product Development approach, which
ensured engineering organizations responsible for each HSI domain had a voice.
3. The integration of HSI and systems engineering in the early phases of the acquisition life
cycle.
4. Participation in the "Blue Two" program, which ensured Pratt & Whitney engineers
understood the challenges facing actually maintainers.
3.2.8 Conclusions
Conclusions are drawn by addressing the research questions identified for this case study and
then applying those insights to the case study proposition.
Research questions and insights:
1. How did Pratt & Whitney determine how much HSI effort would be needed?
Pratt & Whitney performed over 200 deliverable trade studies for the Air Force and thousands of
internal trade early in development. These trades considered many of the domains of HSI and
integrated those costs into the system.
2. How much did HSI effort eventually cost?
Some specific costs associated with HSI were identified. For example, the "Blue Two program",
additional engine mockups, and additional hours spent on test could all be associated with costs
that improved HSI. However, there was no way for Pratt & Whitney to separate out the costs of
HSI from the rest of development. HSI was integrated into too many parts of the engine to be
accounted for in such a way
3. How did HSI fit into the larger systems engineering picture?
IPD drove systems engineering effort at Pratt & Whitney and HSI was an integral component of
IPD. IPD brings together stakeholders from across Pratt & Whitney's engineering organizations
to make trades and decisions.
The propositions of the case study were defined as follows:
Proposition: HSI effort could be isolated from the larger systems engineering effort spent.
Rival: HSI effort could not be isolated from the larger systems engineering effort spent.
The evidence collected through interviews and literature during the case study have supported
the rival proposition, that HSI effort could not be isolated from the large systems engineering
effort spent.
3.2.9 Limitations
A descriptive case study was applied in this instance due to recommendations made by Yin
(2009) relating to access to personnel and data. Although interviews were conducted with
several engineers with detailed knowledge of the F 119, the unit of analysis of the case study had
ended in 1991, 17 years before the case study was begun. Memories likely faded in that time.
Specific costs related to HSI may have been more readily available had the case study been
conducted shortly earlier.
Definitions and perceptions of HSI from the time period of the unit of analysis differed from
present-day policy, both at Pratt and Whitney, and within government. Not every current
domain recognized by INCOSE was addressed during the development of the F 119. However,
the challenges faced in the execution of the case study reflect those that would impede any
researcher interested in HSI. Acquisition projects often take years to complete, and the domains
of HSI applied in any particular program shift in response to program priorities.
3.2.10 Takeaways/Next Steps
The overarching goal of the case study was to document a best a practice of HSI in the Air Force,
with the hope that insights gained would inform subsequent research objectives. This section
summarizes the insights drawn from the case study relevant to the rest of the research described
in this thesis.
Emphasis on Requirements: It was shown that much of the work that led to HSI success resulted
from formal deliverables required by the Air Force. The trade studies that were done early in
development represent the exploration of how to fulfill requirements. Later in development, the
process for recommending changes to requirements became a part of IPD/systems engineering
and incorporated the perspectives of multiple HSI stakeholders. Going forward in this research,
requirements will be examined as a driver of HSI effort.
Early Decisions Define the System: The unit of analysis of the case study was the development
of the F 119 from concept development through to the beginning of EMD. Previous literature has
shown that engineers often think of human considerations as part of test and evaluation,
occurring later in a system's life cycle (Harrison and Forster 2003). However, as shown in the
case study, decisions made during early phases of development define what types of effort will
be emphasized and predict the success or failure of HSI. Further research will therefore focus on
these early stages of development.
Importance of Teams: IPD was identified as critical to HSI success. A defining characteristic of
IPD is the use of integrated product teams (IPTs) to perform trades and collaborate on major
decisions. IPTs have become a hallmark of sound systems engineering practice. Further
research will therefore give consideration to the need to factor in multiple points of view when
making effort predictions for HSI.
3.3 Introduction of HSI into a Systems Engineering Cost Model
The hypothesis of this thesis is:
e HI: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated as a function of total Systems
Engineering Effort.
The case study described in section 3.2 showed that no direct numerical relationship between
HSI effort and systems engineering effort could be identified; HSI was integrated throughout
systems engineering. Instead, insights gained from the case study highlighted the need to
consider requirements when estimating HSI effort. As a result, the following sub-hypothesis was
developed:
0 H2: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated by counting "number of HSI-
related requirements."
Another major insight gained through the case study was that any HSI cost estimation would
need to occur early in development, before requirements had been finalized. As a result, the
Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model (COSYSMO) was identified for further
exploration.
3.3.1 The Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model (COSYSMO)
The Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model (COSYSMO) is a parametric model used to
estimate systems engineering effort. The operation of parametric models is discussed in section
2.3.6. Parametric models are most often associated with cost estimation around the Milestone B
decision point (Roper 2006; Defense Acquisition University 2009). However, they can be
applied at any point prior to Milestone B, given the necessary inputs are available. It should be
kept in mind, however, that estimates based off of changing or poorly defined inputs will be less
precise than estimates with more defined inputs. COSYSMO uses systems engineering size
drivers to produce its estimates. An example of how to use COSYSMO, including how to
capture the inputs needed by the model, is given in section 4.3
3.3.1.1 Model Form
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Figure 8. COSYSMO operational concept.
The operational concept for COSYSMO is illustrated in Figure 8. In order to use the model,
estimators need to understand the expected technical capabilities of the system to be developed
and make basic assumptions about the organization performing the technical work. COSYSMO
requires no complex calculations on the part of the user. System characteristics are simply
assigned complexity ratings such as "easy" or "difficult" and the appropriate effect on effort is
calculated based on the Cost Estimating Relationship. However, COSYSMO does allow more
advanced users to calibrate the model to their specific organizations in order to increase the
model's accuracy. The specific parameters to COSYSMO are described in the next section.
COSYSMO is a parametric cost model. As described in section 2.3.6, parametric cost models
generate cost estimates based on mathematical relationships between independent variables (e.g.,
requirements) and dependent variables (e.g., effort). These relationships are known as Cost
Estimating Relationships (CERs). The basic CER embedded in COSYSMO includes additive,
multiplicative and exponential parameters as shown in Equation 1.
Equation 1. COSYSMO Cost Estimating Relationship (CER).
where:
PM effort in person-months
A = calibration constant derived from historical project data
Size = determined by computing the weighted sum of the four size drivers
E economy/diseconomy of scale; default is 1.0
n number of cost drivers (14)
EM, effort multiplier for the ith cost driver; nominal is 1.0.
The general rationale for whether a factor is additive, exponential, or multiplicative comes from
the following criteria (Boehm, Valerdi et al 2005):
A factor is additive if it has a local effect on the included entity. For example, adding another
source instruction, function point entity, requirement, module, interface, operational scenario, or
algorithm to a system has mostly local additive effects. From the additive standpoint, the impact
of adding a new item would be inversely proportional to its current size. For example, adding 1
requirement to a system with 10 requirements corresponds to a 10% increase in size while
adding the same single requirement to a system with 100 requirements corresponds to a 1%
increase in size.
A factor is multiplicative if it has a global effect across the overall system. For example, adding
another level of service requirement, development site, or incompatible customer has mostly
global multiplicative effects. Consider the effect of the factor on the effort associated with the
product being developed. If the size of the product is doubled and the proportional effect of that
factor is also doubled, then it is a multiplicative factor. For example, introducing a high security
requirement to a system with 10 requirements would translate to a 40% increase in effort.
Similarly, a high security requirement for a system with 100 requirements would also increase by
40%.
A factor that is exponential has both a global effect and an emergent effect for larger systems. If
the effect of the factor is more influential as a function of size because of the amount of rework
due to architecture, risk resolution, team compatibility, or readiness for SoS integration, then it is
treated as an exponential factor.
The size drivers and cost drivers of COSYSMO were determined via a Delphi exercise by a
group of experts in the fields of systems engineering, software engineering, and cost estimation.
The definitions for each of the drivers, while not final, attempt to cover those activities that have
the greatest impact on estimated systems engineering effort and duration. These drivers are
further discussed in the next two sections.
3.3.1.2 Size Drivers
It can be empirically shown that developing complex systems like a satellite ground station
represents a larger systems engineering effort than developing simple systems, such as a toaster.
In order to differentiate the two, four size drivers were developed to help quantify their relative
complexities. The role of size drivers is to capture the functional size of the system from the
systems engineering perspective. They represent a quantifiable characteristic that can be arrived
at by objective measures.
Since the focus of COSYSMO is systems engineering effort, its size drivers need to apply to
software, hardware, and systems containing both. They are: (1) Number of System Requirements,
(2) Number of System Interfaces, (3) Number of System-Specific Algorithms, and (4) Number of
Operational Scenarios. A more detailed discussion on the use of the Number ofRequirements
driver to estimate HSI effort is addressed in section 3.3.2.
3.3.1.3 Effort Multipliers
Table 4. Fourteen cost drivers and corresponding data items
Driver Name Data Item
Requirements understanding Subjective assessment of the understanding of system
Requirementsung requirements
Architecture understanding Subjective assessment of the understanding of the
_______________________system architecture
Level of service requirements Subjective difficulty of satisfying the key performance
parameters (i.e., reliability, maintainability,
manufacturability, etc.)
Migration complexity Influence of legacy system (if applicable)
Technology risk Maturity, readiness, and obsolescence of technology
Documentation to match Breadth and depth of required documentation
life cycle needs
# and Diversity of Sites, installations, operating environment, and diverse
installations/platforms platforms
# of Recursive levels in the Number of applicable levels of the Work Breakdown
design Structure
Stakeholder team cohesion Subjective assessment of all stakeholders and their
ability to work together effectively
Personnel/team capability Subjective assessment of the team's intellectual
capability
Personnel Subjective assessment of staff experience in the domain
experience/continuity and consistency on the project
Process capability CMMI level or equivalent rating
Multi-site coordination Location of stakeholders and coordination barriers
Tool support Subjective assessment of SE tools
A group of fourteen effort multipliers have been identified as significant drivers of systems
engineering effort. These are used to adjust the nominal person-month effort of the system under
development. Each driver is defined by a set of rating levels and corresponding multiplier factors.
The nominal level always has an effort multiplier of 1.0, which has no effect on the CER. Off-
nominal ratings change the overall estimated effort based on pre-defined values.
Assigning ratings for these drivers is not as straight forward as the size drivers mentioned
previously. The difference is that most of the cost drivers are qualitative in nature and require
subjective assessment. A list of the fourteen cost drivers is provided in Table 4 with the
corresponding data items or information needed in order to assess each driver.
If the ratings for effort multipliers associated with HSI effort are expected to vary significantly
from ratings for systems engineering in general, the effort multipliers can be adjusted in relation
to only the work being done by the HSI organization. An example is outlined in section 4.3.
However, this approach assumes that HSI activities can be singled out from systems engineering
effort, which, as previously discussed, can be difficult.
3.3.1.4 Number of System Requirements Size Driver
Of the four COSYSMO size drivers, Number ofRequirements was selected for further research
with regard to the role of HSI effort within systems engineering, based on the insights gained
from literature review and the case study discussed in section 3.2.
HSI adds to the challenges in defining the Number ofRequirements size driver. The COSYSMO
definition of the Number ofRequirements size driver is provided below.
"Number of System Requirements: This driver represents the number of
requirements for the system-of-interest at a specific level of design. The quantity
of requirements includes those related to the effort involved in system engineering
the system interfaces, system specific algorithms, and operational scenarios.
Requirements may be functional, performance, feature, or service-oriented in
nature depending on the methodology used for specification. They may also be
defined by the customer or contractor. Each requirement may have effort
associated with it such as verification and validation, functional decomposition,
functional allocation, etc. System requirements can typically be quantified by
counting the number of applicable shalls/wills/shoulds/mays in the system or
marketing specification. Note: some work is involved in decomposing
requirements so that they may be counted at the appropriate system-of-interest
(Valerdi 2008).
As mentioned in the definition of the size driver, it must be assured that requirements have been
decomposed to the correct level before being counted in COSYSMO. The counting rules
adopted in COSYSMO are summarized here:
1. Determine the system of interest.
2. Decompose system objectives, capabilities, or measures of effectiveness into
requirements that can be tested, verified, or designed.
3. Provide a graphical or narrative representation of the system of interest and how it relates
to the rest of the system.
4. Count the number of requirements in the system/marketing specification or the
verification test matrix for the level of design in which systems engineering is taking
place in the desired system of interest.
5. Determine the volatility, complexity, and reuse of requirements. (Valerdi 2008)
Counting rules 1-4 are further explored in chapter 4, implementation and validation. They are
the subject of significant further research in this thesis. The fifth counting rule is discussed here.
Many of the problems faced when trying to consistently count requirements for the purposes of
cost estimation are more complicated when the requirements span multiple HSI domains. In
addition, the definition of what constitutes an "HSI requirement" can vary between stakeholders,
since different stakeholders count different domains under HSI. Stakeholders therefore often
disagree on how to designate a requirement's complexity. This is due in part to the different
types of requirements (i.e., functional, operational, environmental) that are used to define
systems and their functions, the different levels of requirements decomposition used by
organizations, and the varying degree of quality of requirements definition (how well they are
written). The first four counting rules in COSYSMO help to mitigate many of these issues, but
not all can be addressed. Therefore, complexity ratings can be assigned to individual
requirements that affect their weight. The complexity ratings are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Number of system requirements rating scale (Valerdi 2008).
Easy Medium Difficult
Simple to implement Familiar Complex to implement or
engineer
Traceable to source Can be traced to source with Hard to trace to source
some effort
Little requirements Some overlap High degree of requirements
overlap overlap
Further discussion of complexity ratings and how to assign them can be found in (Valerdi 2008).
This section introduced the COSYSMO model and the role of requirements in estimating
systems engineering size. The next section explores the relationship between requirements
engineering, systems engineering, and HSI with the goal of identifying areas for improvement.
3.3.2 Requirements as a Driver of Systems Engineering and HSI Effort
3.3.2.1 Role of Requirements in Systems Engineering and Acquisition
Requirements are central to the practice of systems engineering. Two widely-accepted
definitions are:
"a statement that identifies a system, product or process' characteristic or
constraint, which is unambiguous, clear, unique, consistent, stand-alone (not-
grouped), and verifiable, and is deemed necessary for stakeholder acceptability"
(International Council on Systems Engineering 2006).
"a statement that identifies a product or process operational, functional, or
design characteristic or constraint, which is unambiguous, testable or measurable,
and necessary for product or process acceptability (by consumers or internal
quality assurance guidelines)" (International Organization for Standardization
2005).
In the Department of Defense, stakeholder requirements are expressed as capabilities, defined as:
"The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions
through combinations of means and ways across doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to
perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action. It is defined by an
operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an
Initial Capabilities Document or an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) or a
joint, DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCR). In the case of materiel
proposals/documents, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF
performance attributes identified in the Capability Development Document (CDD)
and the Capability Production Document (CPD)" (CJCS 2009).
The Department of Defense has shifted toward the use of the term "capabilities" rather than
"requirements" in order to emphasize that a system or program does not always need to be built
in order to achieve a desired outcome. Often, needs can be satisfied by changing the use of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities
(DOTMLPF). However, once it is decided that the needed capabilities require a new program to
be initiated, the resulting set of capabilities can be analyzed in the same way as requirements.
Therefore, further use of the term "requirements" can refer to any of the three definitions listed
above.
3.3.2.2 Requirements Engineering
Much of the work on requirements engineering has been in the realm of software engineering; a
definition of requirements engineering adapted to systems engineering follows:
"Requirements engineering is the branch of engineering concerned with the real-world goals for,
functions of, and constraints on systems. It is also concerned with the relationship of these
factors to precise specifications of system behavior and to their evolution over time and across
families of related systems" (Laplante 2009). As described in detail in (Hull, Jackson et al.
2005), "requirements engineering has a vital role to play at every stage of development." It is an
integral part of systems engineering and a driver of systems engineering effort.
As systems become more complex and software-intensive, the practice of rigorous systems
engineering becomes more critical to program performance. As discussed in section 2.2, the
modern practice of systems engineering spans both technical and social disciplines. Likewise,
requirements engineering is both an engineering and a humanistic endeavor, since understanding
individual human behavior and social dynamics is critical to delivering systems that meet users'
needs and expectations.
Effort spent on systems engineering has been shown to directly correlate to program schedule
and performance (Elm, Goldenson et al. 2008). It follows, therefore, that the quality of
requirements engineering should be of similar importance, as related work has supported
(Hofmann and Lehner 2001; Kamata and Tamai 2007).
While previous studies have emphasized the importance of quality systems engineering and
requirements engineering practice, there continues to be a disconnect between academic research
and industry practice (M iller 2005). One study of software requirements showed that inspection
of software requirements was mostly informal and ad hoc about one-quarter of the time (Neill
and Laplante 2003).
One contributor to this problem is that academic research is difficult to validate without industry
support. Empirical research in particular is lacking and any that does exist tends to be within the
context of a classroom environment (Hfer and Tichy 2007; Espaufa, Condori-Fernandez et al.
2009).
3.3.2.3 Requirements Decomposition/Derivation
At the heart of requirements engineering lies requirements decomposition and derivation. The
counting rules in COSYSMO asks the system stakeholder to either derive or decompose
requirements to a level at which they may be input into the cost model. The counting rules are
agnostic; the method of decomposition or derivation is not important, the counting rules are
meant to be general enough to accommodate multiple methods.
When a requirement is decomposed, it is broken down into two or more "requirements whose
total content is equal to the content of the original one," whereas a derived requirement is created
from an existing requirement, but is different, and so the original requirement is not replaced
(Eigner, Haesner et al. 2002). Although the distinction between decomposition and derivation is
important, the end goal for the purposes of cost estimation is the same: to arrive at a set of
requirements that can analyzed for the purposes of estimating systems engineering effort. For
that reason, it should be assumed that future mention of "requirements decomposition" in this
thesis includes both decomposition and derivation, for simplicity sake.
3.3.2.4 Functional and Nonfunctional Requirements
Whether a given requirement will result in decomposed or derived requirements depends largely
on whether the original requirement is a functional or nonfunctional requirement.
A system specification may contain many different types of technical requirements varying in
nature and complexity. Functional requirements are the fundamental or essential subject matter
of the system. They describe what the product has to do or what processing actions it is to take.
An example of a functional requirement is "The engine shall provide a thrust-to-weight ratio of
T." Each functional requirement should have a criterion or use case. These serve as benchmarks
to allow the systems engineer to determine whether the implemented product has met the
requirement.
Functional requirements are more likely to be decomposed than derived. In Defense Acquisition,
functional requirements go through the JCIDS process, which means they must be linked to
Concepts of Operations and are reviewed at major milestones. They may be complex, but are
unlikely to be replaced by a derived requirement. Instead, subsequent requirements would
describe the original requirement, just in greater detail.
Nonfunctional requirements are the properties that the system must have, such as performance
and usability. These requirements are as important as functional requirements to a product's
success, but are not always weighted accordingly (GAO 2003b).
As previous work has shown, early systems engineering decisions make significant impacts on
system life cycle costs (Bahill and Henderson 2005). Oftentimes, costs are driven by
"nonfunctional" requirements, which are generally defined as requirements that must be met but
are not central to defining a system's core function or capability (Neill and Laplante 2003). The
understood definition of a nonfunctional requirement varies across organizations, but it is clear
that all requirements, functional or not, are the responsibility of the systems engineer to realize
(Glinz 2007).
Nonfunctional requirements are more likely to result in derived requirements because
nonfunctional requirements do not go through the same checks as do functional requirements in
JCIDS. Nonfunctional requirements are often added to requirements documents by acquisition
professionals after draft functional requirements have been submitted. As a result, nonfunctional
requirements will often contain generic language that must be adapted to the system of interest.
Once new requirements pertinent to the system-of-interest have been derived, they too will need
to be decomposed to a level appropriate to be counted in COSYSMO.
3.3.2.5 HSI and Requirements
HSI requirements are often expressed as nonfunctional requirements because they describe
usability, operational and maintainability characteristics of the system. However, they can also
be expressed as functional requirements, if a functional requirement pertains to HSI or one of its
domains.
One challenge to counting of "HSI requirements" for the purposes of estimating HSI effort is
that the term "HSI requirement" is not clearly defined. The Air Force HSI Office's Human
Systems Integration Requirements Pocket Guide states "HSI practitioners should avoid thinking
in terms of 'HSI Requirements' which suggest that there should be unique requirements specific
to HSI. Instead, the HSI community should focus on the fact that any requirement may have HSI
implications and that the role of HSI community is to highlight the human considerations that
naturally occur as part of good and effective capability based requirements"(Air Force Human
Systems Integration Office 2009b).
While the sentiments expressed in the Pocket Guide are sound, they leave a gap in semantic
understanding. The term "HSI requirements" is used in a number of policies and documents (for
example, in the Pocket Guide itself) and a definition helps to ensure stakeholders agree when
speaking about HSI requirements.
The following definition for an "HSI requirement" is therefore proposed: "HSI requirements
include, but are not limited to, any requirement pertaining to one or more domains of HSI, or the
integration of those domains. Broadly, the term encompasses any requirement that contributes to
the integration of human considerations into the system being developed." So as to reduce
confusion in terms, "HSI-related requirements," "HSI-relevant requirements," and "HSI
requirements" are all meant to represent the same concept in this thesis.
The term "nonfunctional" incorrectly implies that requirements that are not functional
requirements must have a smaller impact on a system than functional requirements. Reliability,
user interface, and safety are just some of the types of nonfunctional requirements that clearly
defy such a simplification. Since HSI requirements are often nonfunctional requirements, they
face the same stigma.
While the definition of nonfunctional requirements contributes to the difficulties of properly
accounting for their impact on systems engineering effort, the difficulties are exacerbated by the
requirements elicitation structure of the Department of Defense (DoD). In the United States, the
DoD is the largest government customer of large systems acquisitions and is a leading agency in
the evolution of systems engineering best practices and standards. The DoD defines system
requirements using CDDs (see section 2.1.2). CDD's assign a hierarchy of importance to
requirements explicitly using a name scheme and implicitly, via their position within the CDD.
The next section explores how the challenges facing nonfunctional and particularly HSI
requirements might be overcome.
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4 IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION
This section discusses the quantitative exploration of the hypotheses of this thesis. Two
workshops were conducted and the insights gained from both are integrated into an example
application of the COSYSMO model with implications for cost estimation in general.
4.1 Workshop 1: Application of Requirements Counting Rules
4.1.1 Overview
The Annual International Forum on the Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO) and
Systems/Software Cost Modelling brings together representatives from industry, academia, and
government interested in furthering the development of cost models such as COSYSMO. An
exercise on requirements decomposition was developed in order to capitalize on the expertise of
the Forum's participants.
The 2009 Forum was held at MIT from November 2 to 5h, 2009. A workshop on COSYSMO
was held as part of the program on November 5th. The research exercise described in the
following section occurred between 1OAM and 12PM during this workshop. Use of the term
"workshop" refers only to work done during this period, not to the COSYSMO workshop as a
whole.
4.1.2 Research Design
4.1.2.1 Research Question and Hypotheses
The research question explored in the workshop was developed from the existing hypothesis and
sub-hypotheses of this thesis:
HI: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated as a function of total Systems
Engineering Effort.
H2: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated by counting "number of
HSI-related requirements"
Workshop 1: Existing counting rules can be adapted to better account for
HSI requirements
Research Question: How can COSYSMO counting rules be modified to improve counting of
HSI-related requirements?
Two testable hypotheses were then developed from this research question:
Hypothesis #1: Using the cost estimation decomposition steps will produce requirements counts
with high reliability across respondents.
Hypothesis #2: The cost estimation counting rules will help users quantify the number of HSI
requirements to be input into COSYSMO.
4.1.2.2 Methods
Method Selection: The experimental simulation approach, as elucidated by McGrath (McGrath
1966) was used to develop the workshop. Experimental simulations are used when the
experimenter can put participants into "contrived or created settings" (McGrath 1981).
Laboratory experiments also put participants into created settings, but experimental simulations
differ from laboratory experiments in that experimental simulations seek to "recreate or simulate
the central features of some set of phenomenon which are of interest" (Klimoski 1978) whereas
laboratory experiments "attempt to create a generic or universal 'setting"'(McGrath 1981).
The workshop sought to simulate how COSYSMO is used in real-world environments and
identify possible improvements, particularly with respect to its application to HSI. In real-world
systems, requirements are developed and refined by IPTs, groups of individuals whose personal
views and relationships can affect the process. Context is also important - requirements take on
differing meanings and difficulties, depending on the system being designed.
Experimental simulations facilitate negotiations, allowing the capture of group-related variables
that would otherwise be difficult to control. They also provide participants with a realistic, as
opposed to a generic context.
Procedures: Subjects were paired into teams of two to simulate the natural discussion that would
occur in a requirements IPT. Teams were limited to two participants in order to maximize the
number of useful data points generated.
Participants were asked to imagine they were participating on a requirements integrated product
team responsible for the design of a "glass console" that would replace a standard SUV console,
modeled off of the glass displays that have replaced traditional displays in some airliner cockpits.
The system boundary was defined as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. SUV console design task (redjar 2007)
The format and content of the displays was modeled after requirements taken from government-
furnished documents. An example is shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Sample requirement used during workshop 1.
The workshop adhered to the following schedule:
1. Distribute data collection forms (see Appendix 7.1)
2. Background information
a. Purpose and goals of workshop
b. Counting rules for cost estimation
c. Definition of HSI
3. Introduce Task 1
4. Participants complete survey task 1
a. Participants are given 2 minutes to analyze one requirement
b. Participants record data for eight requirements.
5. Participants repeat process for survey tasks 2 and 3.
Survey Tasks: Three of the five counting rules for COSYSMO were developed into survey
questions. Changing the counting rules into questions allowed quantitative data to be collected
quickly and analyzed uniformly. The adaptations were made based on the full descriptions of the
COSYSMO counting rules from (Valerdi 2008).
The adaptations made to counting rules 1 and 2 are straightforward and are summarized in
Figure 11. The adaptation made in counting rule 3 warrants further explanation. The description
of rule 3 of the COSYSMO counting rules is as follows:
"This step focuses on the hierarchical relationship between the system elements.
This information can help describe the size of the system and its levels of design.
It serves as a sanity check for the previous two steps" (Valerdi 2008).
As discussed in section 3.3.2.4, HSI requirements are often represented as nonfunctional
requirements. If proper systems engineering is done, nonfunctional requirements will be mapped
across a systems specification to the areas they affect. In fact, the original COSYSMO guideline
states that rule 3 should act as a "sanity check." Therefore, the adaptation of the rule into a
survey question adopted the "sanity check" mentality by asking participants to estimate only
whether a given HSI requirement would decompose to zero, one, or many requirements.
Some HSI requirements might pertain to higher or lower level systems and so would not affect
the requirements count of the system of interest. Others might be written and counted the same
way as any other requirement, but contain some element relevant to HSI. Still others might
result in many derived requirements (a description of derived vs. decomposed requirements can
be found in section 3.3.2.3) relevant to the system of interest and therefore would represent the
equivalent effort of many requirements.
Cautions and Warnings. Method for
displaying system warnings, cautions. and
alarms must be appropriate given the
importance of the situation (Threshold).
The resulting survey questions are reproduced in Figure 11.
1.Determine the system of interest. 4 Is the requirement at the level of
the system-of-interest?
2. Decompose system objectives, capabilities, or Can the requirement be tested,
measures of effectiveness into requirements that can be i b
tested, verified, or designed. verified or designed?
3. Provide a gaphical or narrative representation of the Does the HSI requirement
system of interest and how it relates to the rest of the decompose to none, one, or many
system. requirements?
Figure 11. Development of survey questions.
4.1.3 Participant Demographics
Eight women and 8 men participated in the workshop. Participants came primarily from
academia. Affiliations are shown in Table 6. Two participants omitted demographic
information.
Table 6. Workshop 1 participant affiliations
The participants were asked to complete a pre-experiment survey to gather some descriptive data
on the participants and their professional experience. The questionnaire can be found in
Appendix 7.1. Participants were asked to rate their familiarity with Systems Engineering,
Industry 5
Aerospace Corporation 2
Lockheed Martin 1
Pratt & Whitney 1
Raytheon 1
Academia 8
MIT 3
University of Bath, UK 1
University of MD 1
USC 3
Research/Consulting 1
Institute for Defense 1
Analyses
Requirements Management/Engineering, Requirements Decomposition, COSYSMO, and
Human Systems Integration. A Likert scale with three levels was used for the first three
measures. Results are reproduced in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Workshop 1 participants' experience in systems engineering, requirements
management/engineering, and requirements decomposition.
Because participants' familiarity with COSYSMO
varied, a five-level Likert was used in both cases.
and with HSI were expected to be more
The results are reproduced in Figure 13.
Familiarity with
COSYSMO
El First Exposure
* Heard of it
* Used briefly
* Used
extensively
* Helped to
develop
0 First Exposure
* Heard of it
* Trained
* Experienced
* Expert
Familiarity with HSI
Figure 13. Workshop 1 participants' experience with COSYSMO and HSI.
None of the participants in the exercise had worked on the same programs, which means they
were unlikely to have been influenced by past experience on an IPT together. Many other
factors, such as gender, age, and experience, could not be controlled for.
The data show that most of the respondents thought highly of their knowledge of systems
engineering and requirements. Familiarity with COSYSMO, however, was more varied. Six
10
8-C
6
. 4 0 Nonea.
6 2 a Some
N Extensive
Sys Eng Req Req Decomp
Man/Eng
Type of experience
respondents considered themselves experts in COSYSMO or had worked on its development, but
seven respondents reported little familiarity with the model.
4.1.4 Data/Results
4.1.4.1 Hypothesis #1: Producing Requirements Counts with High Reliability
The first survey question asked participants to judge "is this requirement at the level of the glass
console? If not, is it too high or too low?" Instructions to the participants were adapted from
Cockburn's software use case hierarchy (Cockburn 2001). The quantitative data taken from
participants' responses are presented here.
Figure 14. Survey question 1 results.
The results showed that consensus between participants largely depended on the requirement
being considered. As the data show, participants tended to agree about requirements 1, 2, 5, 6,
and 8. Participants agreed that the answer was one of two choices in requirements 3 and 4.
Requirement 7 showed participants clearly disagreeing.
The second survey question asked participants to provide a "yes" or "no" response separately as
to whether each of the requirements in question could be tested, verified, or designed. This
section generated the most feedback from participants, as different stakeholders understood these
terms to have different meanings. The participants' responses, both quantitative and qualitative,
were binned into three categories after the workshop, as shown in Figure 15.
Is the Requirement at the Sea Level?
8
7
6
5 -M Too Low
4 -E Sea Level
53
2 Too High
Unsure
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
requirement #
Figure 15. Survey question 2 results.
Once again, a spectrum of answers appears. Participants agreed about requirements 1,3 and 6,
but were unsure about 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8.
4.1.4.2 Hypothesis #2: Helping Users Quantify HSI Requirementsfor Cost Estimation
The third survey question asked participants whether the requirement in question should
correspond to zero, one, or many requirements at the level of the system of interest. Respondents
were not asked to estimate an exact figure for "many requirements" as such an estimate would
have required more time and analysis than was available.
How many requirements does this
HSI requirement decompose to?
-I
-IJ *
-t
O None
" One Requirement
" Many Requirements
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
requirement #
Figure 16. Survey question 3 results.
In this phase, participants agreed on requirements 1,3, 4, and 5, but disagreed about the other
requirements.
Can the Requirement be Tested,
Verified, or Designed?
8
7?A
5 5
4L 0 No
3 Unsure
2-
- NYes
0
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requirement #
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4.1.5 Discussion
Hypothesis #1: Using the cost estimation decomposition steps will produce requirements counts
that are common across users.
As described in the previous section, participants reached a majority consensus in 7 out 8
instances for survey question 1. Participants reached a majority consensus in 5 of 8 instances for
survey question 2. However, consensus was highly dependent on the requirement in question.
When the threshold for consensus is put higher, for example a 75% majority rather than 50%,
consensus is reached in only 2 of 8 instances for survey question 1 and 3 of 8 instances for
survey question 2.
Qualitatively, participants struggled with the distinction between "system-of-interest" and the
concept of "sea level". Participants understood the two concepts separately but did not see how
they related.
Participants also found it difficult to decide whether a requirement tested, verified, or designed.
Participants expressed varying views on the definition of each term. Domain experience also
affected answers. For example, some participants thought that a requirement that electrical
systems not fail during the lifetime of a system was not testable, but others with experience in
reliability engineering thought that the requirement could be verified through analysis.
Resulting proposed modifications to the COSYSMO counting rules that resulted from these
insights are discussed in section 4.1.6.2.
Hypothesis #2: The cost estimation decomposition steps will help users quantify the number of
HSI requirements to be input into COSYSMO.
The least agreement was seen on survey question 3. Participants came to a majority consensus
on four of the eight requirements tested. Each of time consensus was reached, participants
responded that the requirement should be associated with "many requirements" worth of effort.
The hypothesis is therefore only partially supported. Given the broad ranges participants were
given to bin their estimates in, consensus was poor. However, the counting rules did identify a
need to better count HSI requirement effort.
The major point of conflict between participants was whether or not the human could be
considered within system boundaries. As a result, many participants chose to rate HSI
requirements as the equivalent of no requirements because they felt that the requirements would
not have affected the system-of-interest. Nonetheless, in every case in which the pairs reached a
majority consensus, that consensus was that the requirement in question should decompose to
"many" equivalent requirements for counting purposes. While this result could be influenced by
the specifics of the requirements themselves, it warrants further study.
4.1.6 Conclusions
4.1.6.1 Threats to Validity
In the course of the workshop, it became apparent that even systems engineers with high
amounts of experience with requirements management and engineering could come to very
different conclusions about the same high-level requirement. This was in large part due to the
fact that the requirements used in the workshop were at times intentionally vague, redundant, or
wordy; essentially, the exercise requirements were not ideal requirements.
These requirements were chosen because they were similar to ones that had been reviewed from
government-furnished documents and were validated by experts in industry practices.
Stakeholder requirements, particularly those that appear in draft form early in a system's
development, cannot be expected to be ideal from a requirements engineering perspective.
COSYSMO counting rules are meant to allow the early cost estimator or systems engineer to
better grasp the expected need for systems engineering in a system using only whatever
imperfect requirements are available.
Participants often had different perspectives on how a particular requirement should be read.
They also disagreed about how to define terms like "system-of-interest", "test", and "verify".
Some used the definitions they had been trained to use in industry. Others used applied natural-
language definitions. Once again, however, these conditions are similar to those that might be
found on a real-world requirements IPT. Stakeholders who define early requirements are not
always systems engineers; in fact, they seldom are (Eigner, Haesner et al. 2002).
4.1.6.2 Modifications to COSYSMO counting rules
The observations taken from the workshop have resulted in proposed changes to the COSYSMO
counting rules.
In counting rule 1, a more clear distinction between the terms "system-of-interest" and "sea level"
should be made. Determining the system-of-interest establishes whether a given requirement is
relevant. Determining sea level establishes whether a relevant requirement is at the correct level
of decomposition to be counted in COSYSMO.
In survey question 1, participants were asked to determine whether a given requirement pertained
to the system of interest. However, the framework used to quantify this measure, Cockburn's
use case hierarchy, addresses whether a requirement is at the "level" of the system-of-interest.
Many participants correctly commented that higher-level requirements could affect the effort
associated with the system-of-interest, but not be at its "sea level". As a result, the first counting
rule should be split into two, and application of Cockburn's hierarchy with respect to the system
of interest should be made explicit in the second step.
In counting rule 2, the guideline should be changed to read "Assess Ability to Verify or Design"
and to summarize the guidance provided on these terms by the Defense Acquisition Guidebook
and other sources.
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2009) defines verification as the process that "confirms
that the system element meets the design to or build-to specifications as defined in the functional,
allocated, and product baselines." Verification can be accomplished through 4 different means:
(1) Demonstration, (2) Inspection, (3) Analysis, and (4) Test. Verification principally happens
during the test and evaluation phase of systems development, but systems engineers are
responsible for constant verification of requirements throughout the life cycle of a system.
In certain cases, verification of a requirement within the context of a system of interest may not
be possible, but the requirement may still impact systems engineering effort needed. Consider,
for example, if the system of interest was a car steering wheel and the requirement being
considered dealt with crash safety. The designers of the steering wheel should make design
considerations for safety, but verification of safety requirements would probably be best done as
part of vehicle-level crash tests.
Systems engineers using the COSYSMO counting rules need to be able to determine whether an
HSI or other nonfunctional requirement is relevant to the system-of-interest. Once this is done, a
derived requirement at the highest level must be written. This derived requirement must then be
decomposed to a set of sea level requirements to be counted in COSYSMO. Counting 3 is
therefore actually a multi-step process.
The following count rules modifications are recommended:
1. Determine the system of interest. For an airplane, the system of interest may be the
avionics subsystem, the engine or the entire airplane depending on the perspective of the
organization interested in estimating HSI. This key decision needs to be made early on to
determine the scope of the COSYSMO estimate and identify the requirements that are
applicable for the chosen system.
a. Decompose system objectives, capabilities, or measures of effectiveness down
to the level of the system of interest.
2. Assess whether the requirements can be verified or designed. The decomposition of
requirements must be performed by the organization using COSYSMO. The level of
decomposition of interest for COSYSMO is the level in which the system will be
designed and tested.
3. Provide a graphical or narrative representation of the system of interest and how it
relates to the rest of the system. This step focuses on the hierarchical relationship
between the system elements. This information can help describe the size of the system
and its levels of design. It serves as a sanity check for the previous two steps. In some
cases, DODAF diagrams are an adequate approach (US Department of Defense 2007).
a. Determine the impact of nonfunctional requirements on the system-of-
interest
b. Follow steps 1 and 2 for any requirements derived in step 3.a.
Since counting of requirements for COSYSMO ultimately leads to an input to a cost model, the
output of the model can in turn help systems engineers justify the cost and benefit of quality
requirements to decision-makers. Better requirements ultimately result in a higher-performing
system.
4.1.6.3 Insights for Follow-Up Work
This workshop confirmed the need for better counting rules, particularly for HSI and other
nonfunctional requirements. Participants expressed frustration and confusion over their tasks,
either because the sample requirements were not written well or because they did not understand
the decomposition guidelines. Such frustrations evoke the experiences of actual requirements
engineers working on real systems.
Qualitatively, participants were immediately able to judge the "quality" of a requirement. In
several cases, participants objected to answering a question on the grounds that the requirement
presented would need to be rewritten in order for the question to be answered. These results
highlight the need for the guidelines presented herein. The requirements presented in these
exercises were all modeled off of actual requirements found in government documents. As such,
there would likely have not been opportunity to modify the requirements. The requirements
decomposition guidelines help to mitigate issues in requirements quality by quantifying the
systems engineering impact each requirement poses. Understanding these impacts helps to
identify those requirements that are least understood or have least quality.
Two needs were identified in the course of the workshop.
1. Better tools for consensus-building.
While participants agreed on the answers to the survey questions presented to them in many
cases, there were differences in interpretation that could not be accounted for. For example,
participants had different definitions of the terms "test," "verify," and "design". These
differences could not be captured in the quantitative data, so it is unclear if answers might have
changed had differences been mitigated.
2. Further exploration of the impact of HSI on effort.
The data showed that participants were most likely to associate the requirements presented
during survey question 3 with the equivalent effort of "many requirements". It is unclear
whether these results were due to the impact of human considerations or simply because the
requirements happened to be difficult. Further study of the effect of HSI on effort is warranted.
4.2 Workshop 2: Estimation of Relative HSI Effort
4.2.1 Overview
Each year, the USC Center for Systems and Software Engineering (CSSE) hosts an Annual
Research Review (ARR). ARR's held during recent years have featured COSYSMO workshops,
during which users and researchers share insights and work to improve the model.
The 2010 COSYSMO workshop was held March 1 1 th, 2010. The first half of the workshop
explored the integration of Human Systems Integration (HSI) into COSYSMO.
4.2.2 Research Design
4.2.2.1 Research Question/Hypothesis
The research question explored in the workshop was developed from the existing hypothesis and
sub-hypotheses of this thesis:
HI: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated as a function of total Systems
Engineering Effort.
H2: Human Systems Integration effort can be estimated by counting "number of
HSI-relevant requirements"
As described in section 4.1.6.3, two needs emerged after Workshop 1: (1) better tools for
consensus building, and (2) further exploration of the impact of HSI on effort.
A research question was developed in response to these needs and in following with the existing
hypothesis and sub-hypothesis.
Research Question: Can an IPT reach a consensus about the effort associated with an HSI-related
requirement during early cost estimation?
A testable hypothesis was then developed from the research question:
Hypothesis: Given an HSI-related requirement, an IPT can reach consensus about the amount of
HSI work needed to satisfy the requirement, as compared to a nominal requirement.
4.2.2.2 Methods
Method Selection: Previous work has shown that even experienced systems engineers often
disagree about how requirements should be counted for cost estimation purposes. The method
applied in this workshop needed to build consensus between the participants.
Procedures: The Wideband Delphi method was applied during the workshop. The following
steps were adapted taken, adapted from (Boehm 1981; Wiegers 2000).
1. Distribute data collection forms (see Appendix 7.2)
2. Introduce task and background information
a. Purpose and goals of workshop
b. Counting rules for cost estimation
c. Definition of HSI
d. Definition of a "nominal requirement"
3. Participants complete round 1 of estimation task individually
4. Facilitator plots results
5. Participants review results
a. Participants discuss assumptions, questions, conflicts
b. Participants modify round 1 inputs as necessary
6. Participants submit round 2 of estimation task
7. Facilitator plots results
8. Participants review results
a. Participants discuss assumptions, questions, conflicts
b. Participants modify round 2 inputs as necessary
9. Participants submit round 3 of estimation task
10. Facilitator plots and analyzes results
The Estimation Task: Little research has been done to address the impact of HSI on requirements.
The most comprehensive resource on the subject is the Air Force HSI Office's HSI
Requirements Pocket Guide, which was used in the design of the estimation task.
The example the Pocket Guide provides of a "Good HSI Requirement" was used as the nominal
requirement in the estimation task. The requirement is reproduced here:
Example of a nominal requirement
Threshold: Operators shall be able to read the XX display (where XX display is the
system being designed) during day and night, with no visible signature at night from 10-
50m. Device must enable operators to keep head up while reading data on computer.
Participants were then asked to compare ten other requirements taken from the Pocket Guide to
the nominal requirement. Requirements were sourced from Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC)- approved Capabilities Development Documents (CDDs) and Capabilities
Production Documents (CPDs).
Participants chose from four comparative levels of effort:
1x 2x 4x 8x
Where lx corresponded to a requirement approximately equal in effort to the nominal
requirement, 2x corresponded to a requirement approximately double the effort of the nominal
requirement, and so on. Available effort estimates doubled so that the change represented by
moving from one estimate to an adjacent estimate was equal, regardless of start position. That is,
if a participant put "1x" during Round 1 and wanted to change her answer to "2x" during Round
2, such a change would have been as if she had started at "2x" and wanted to change to "4x". In
this way, the starting point associated with each requirement should not have affected the
development of consensus.
4.2.2.3 Relationship to previous work
The Wideband Delphi method has been applied in the development of COSYSMO and is the
recommended method for capturing complexity ratings from stakeholders. However, assessing
the complexity of a requirement is the last step in the requirements counting process. Being able
to assess complexity assumes that the requirement in question has already progressed through the
previous four steps effectively. Unfortunately, the data from Workshop 1 show that stakeholders
faced with ambiguous high-level requirements find it difficult to come to a consensus on how a
requirement should be decomposed, prior to assessing complexity.
The use of the Wideband Delphi method described in this workshop would be most useful in
dealing with particularly challenging requirements that a complexity rating may not sufficiently
characterize.
4.2.3 Participant Demographics
Eight men and 3 women participated in the workshop. Participants came primarily from industry.
Affiliations are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Workshop 2 participant affiliations
Industry 9
Northrop Grumman 3
Aerospace 3
Corporation
Boeing 2
Raytheon 1
Academia (USC) 1
Consulting (Sofstar Systems) 1
The participants were asked to complete a pre-experiment survey to gather some descriptive data
on the participants and their professional experience. The questionnaire can be found in
Appendix 7.2. Participants were asked to rate their familiarity with Systems Engineering,
Requirements Management/Engineering, Requirements Decomposition, COSYSMO, Human
Factors/Human Factors Engineering and Human Systems Integration. A single Likert rating
scale was used for each measure:
First exposure | Heard of it | Trained | Experienced I Expert
Results are reproduced in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Workshop participants' experience in relevant fields.
The participants were all trained, experienced, or expert in the fields of Systems Engineering,
Requirements Management/Engineering, and Requirements Decomposition. There was an
almost even split in familiarity levels with the COSYSMO cost model, which suggests that some
participants attended the COSYSMO workshop to learn more about the model, while others
attended to present research or offer guidance. 6 of 11 participants were trained or experienced
in Human Factors or Human Factors Engineering, but 5 of 11 had only heard of these terms. The
majority of participants (8 of 11) had only heard of Human Systems Integration.
4.2.4 Data/Results
4.2.4.1 Change between Rounds
The Delphi method seeks to build consensus between participants. However, whether or not
consensus emerges can depend on the task or question being estimated. The data collected from
participants for each requirement are reproduced here to allow the responses to each individual
requirement to be compared.
One of the 11 participants of the workshop arrived too late to participate in Round 1, so the data
related to that participant has been removed. Demographic and qualitative data take the
participant into account, as the participant contributed to group discussions between rounds.
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Figure 18. Workshop 2 requirement 1 results.
Figure 19. Workshop 2 requirement 2 results.
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Figure 20. Workshop 2 requirement 3 results.
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Figure 21. Workshop 2 requirement 4 results.
*The results for Requirement #4, Round 2 are obscured by the results from Round 3, indicating
no change between rounds.
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Figure 22. Workshop 2 requirement 5 results.
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Figure 23. Workshop 2 requirement 6 results.
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Figure 24. Workshop 2 requirement 7 results.
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Figure 25. Workshop 2 requirement 8 results.
Figure 26. Workshop 2 requirement 9 results.
Figure 27. Workshop 2 requirement 10 results.
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The left graph for each requirement shows how participants changed their effort estimates
between rounds. The box plots in the right graph for each requirement shows how participants'
decisions affected measures of central tendency, namely median and range.
These graphs show that in general, consensus between participants increased after each round
and that the range of estimates participants offered also decreased.
4.2.4.2 Measures of Central Tendency
The previous section showed how participants' estimates were influenced after each round. To
show the cumulative effect of the Wideband Delphi method across all requirements analyzed, the
standard deviations of each round of analysis for each requirement was calculated and
normalized. The values were normalized because requirements needing more effort can be
expected to have higher absolute standard deviations. The results are reported in Figure 28.
Figure 28. Normalized standard deviation as a measure of consensus.
Normalized standard deviation decreased between Round 1 and Round 2 in seven out of ten
cases. It decreased in nine out of ten cases between Round 2 and Round 3. Looking at the total
picture, normalized standard deviation decreased in nine out of ten cases between Round 1 and
Round 3.
Standard deviation shows whether participants converged toward a particular answer; it does not
show whether participants changed collective predictions. Changes in central tendency reflect
collective changes; two measures are graphed in Figure 29.
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Figure 29. Mean and mode change over rounds.
The maximum mean change between Round 1 and Round 3 was a difference of 2. 1x
(Requirement #9, from 4.7x to 6.8x). Normalized to the mean value from Round 3, maximum
change in means between Round 1 and Round 3 was 60% (Requirement #2, from 3.2x to 2x).
Average change in mean across requirements was 29.4%.
Changes in mode represent a shift of all participants from one estimation value to another. Mode
changed between Round 1 and Round 3 in six instances. Mode did not change between Round 2
and Round 3 in any cases.
4.2.4.3 Chapter 6 vs. Chapter 14/15 Requirements
HSI practitioners often find that as budgets and schedules compress, program managers
marginalize HSI efforts in order to fund higher priority requirements. In DoD requirements
documents, requirements are mainly expressed in one of three chapters. Chapter 6 of a CDD
contains key performance parameters (KPPs) and key system attributes (KSAs), the two highest
priority types of requirements. Chapters 14 and 15 contain lower-priority requirements. HSI
considerations are often expressed in these chapters.
Systems engineers understand that requirements designated as higher-priority by the government
will require more investment. However, they often make the mistake of undervaluing
requirements from chapters 14 and 15 simply due to their location in a CDD.
In this workshop, five requirements were taken from chapter 6 of actual CDDs or CPDs and five
requirements from chapters 14 and 15. The graphs shown in Figure 30 compare final Round 3
effort estimates between the two categories of requirements.
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Figure 30. Perception of effort, Chapter 6 vs. Chapter 14/15 requirements.
The left graph shows that participants gave roughly the same amounts of 2x and 4x ratings to
chapter 6 requirements as they did to chapter 14/15 requirements during Round 3 of estimation.
Participants gave more 8x ratings to chapter 6 requirements and more 1x requirements to chapter
14/15 requirements.
The right graph compares mean effort estimates during Round 3, ordered from lowest mean to
highest mean. The graph incorporates the effect of individual requirements while showing that
chapter 6 requirements do not appear to be perceived as more effort-intensive across the board.
4.2.5 Discussion
4.2.5.1 Consensus-building
In this exercise, participants were given a challenging task: to estimate the effort that would be
required of systems engineers to satisfy a requirement, given very little information about how
the system might be built or employed. Estimates made under these conditions will unavoidably
be subject to risk, uncertainty, and volatility. Using a consensus-building method such as the
Wideband Delphi method encourages individuals to express and mitigate differences, addressing
potential risk areas early on.
As shown previously, consensus around one answer improved in 9 out of 10 cases. However,
this result does not make any claims as to whether the participants had selected the "right"
answer, only that they tended to agree on a particular answer. The nature of prediction, however,
is that there is no "right" answer, since the costs will not be known until long after the estimation
exercise ends. Instead, the methods shown in this exercise should be applied in addition to other
method. Delphi surveys can also be conducted multiple times with different groups, to assess
differences in their conclusions.
The exercise was audio-taped and comments were extracted from the transcript. There were
three types of discussions that helped to drive consensus.
1. Specific questions about the meaning of requirements
These questions dealt with acronyms, abbreviations, or interpretation of wording. For example,
one participant asked about what a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) suit was. In
another instance, participants discussed the differences between how the verbs "shall," "must,"
and "will" should be interpreted.
2. Understanding of Systems Engineering/HSI
Some participants initially recorded high estimates on some requirements because they had
mentally included the cost of tests, maintenance, and design within "systems engineering." One
participant stated:
"To me, systems engineering to me is just managing the people, organization and
technology."
This interpretation resonated with participants and participants adjusted their estimates going
forward.
In terms of HSI effort, those more experienced with HSI helped to differentiate HSI effort as a
subset of systems engineering from human-related work in general. One participant stated:
"...I mean ifyou think of it from an HSI perspective, then even ifyou ignored the
difference between the "will" or the "shall," I actually think this is one area
wherefrom a systems engineering perspective, HSI is actually going to be a lot of
effort. This is a lot of what they do; they bring the people in that are going to use
the system and they have them try it out and they consider that and they assess
it...
3. Differences in experience or standard practice
Participants had varying experiences with many of the domains and disciplines covered in the
requirements provided for the workshop. One exchange illustrates how personal experiences
were communicated and contributed to consensus:
Participant 1: "In my mind, making a training module is not nearly as difficult as
designing an electrical piece of hardware, but it touches so many other folks and
it has such a large human element in it, you really got to give yourself a lot longer
schedule, and not unusually a lot more money."
Participant 2: "I think I did it actually lower, you know, because usually I think of
training as something that you worry about after the system's already developed
or kind of set, so you're really not adding effort anywhere within the systems
engineering.
4.2.5.2 Threats to Validity
As the Delphi survey was conducted as part of an existing workshop, little control could be
exercised over the composition of participants. Participant demographics are as reported, above.
Likewise, because the workshop was limited by time, only three rounds of estimation could be
conducted. However, additional rounds may not have helped to build consensus.
Participants may have had different mental models of the term "nominal". Participants were
many times more likely to label a requirement as being equivalent to "2x" or "4x" the effort of a
nominal requirement as they were to label it "1x". While the specific nature of the requirements
used may have been a factor in this result, by definition nominal requirements should make up
the majority of all requirements, so more ratings of "lx" should have appeared. Even if
participants did overestimate, however, the ratings relative to each should be the same. That is, a
requirement rated as "8x" should still be four times as effort-intensive as a requirement rated
"2x", regardless of overestimation bias.
Participants stated that in some cases, 8x equivalent effort was not sufficient. Three participants
wrote in their comments that requirement #4 was equivalent to more than 8x the effort of a
nominal requirement. One participant wrote the same about requirement #5.
In terms of choosing the bounds for this exercise, the levels of 1x through 8x were thought to be
values that participants could effectively differentiate between. For example, the 16x level was
omitted because participants likely could not have effectively differentiated between it and, say a
12x requirement, which is halfway between 16x and 8x. Alternative scales could have been used
and should be explored in future work.
4.2.6 Conclusions
Two significant conclusions can be drawn from the results.
Conclusion 1: Given an HSI-related requirement, an IPT can reach consensus about the amount
of HSI work needed to satisfy the requirement, as compared to a nominal requirement:
hypothesis supported.
Although it was clear from the qualitative feedback gathered during the workshop that
participants were able to mitigate differences between rounds and therefore increase consensus,
such a result is more difficult to show quantitatively. Section 4.2.4.2 showed how standard
deviation of results changed between rounds. Decreasing standard deviation helps estimators
identify a mean effort estimate and assess the confidence they have in that estimate. In other
situations, however, a simple vote may determine an estimate, prediction, or decision.
Had a vote been applied in the workshop, a simple majority would have emerged for every
requirement tested, as shown in Figure 31. During Round 1, an average of 5.4 participants chose
the most popular response in their estimates. By Round 2 that number had increased to 5.8, and
by Round 3 on average 7.1 participants chose the most popular answer.
How many participants selected the most
popular answer?
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Figure 31. Consensus around one answer over time.
These results clearly show that consensus built between participants. However, the hypothesis
was also concerned with the estimation of HSI work. Could the estimates that the participants
agreed on be used directly as an input into COSYSMO?
The Wideband Delphi Process could be used in two ways to better account for HSI effort within
COSYSMO.
1. If the process were performed to the point that consensus was clearly reached, the effort
estimates could be integrated into the counting of "will's," "shall's," and "must's". That
is, instead of counting these words for the requirements analyzed with the Wideband
Delphi method, the resulting effort estimates could be substituted.
2. The Wideband Delphi process could be used to quickly identify requirements that need to
be iterated. For example, if a requirement was expected to correspond to a large amount
of effort because it was badly written, the requirements IPT might use that information to
rewrite, decompose, and assess again.
The two ways in which the Wideband Delphi might be used rest upon the scales used in the
estimation task. If, for example, participants were given ten choices, ranging from 1x to lOx,
they would need to think carefully to select their answers, but those answers would be more
precise than a scale with option of only lx, 5x, and 1 Ox.
Conclusion 2: No statistical difference was seen between Chapter 6 and Chapter 14/15
requirements. Implication: ignoring KPP/KSA status, industry sees HSI requirements from
chapter 14/15 as just as effort-intensive as chapter 6 requirements.
Requirements from both Chapter 6 and Chapter 14/15 of CDDs/CPDs were used because these
are common places where HSI-related requirements are found. The data showed that
participants found the effort related to each type of requirement to be similar. There was not
enough evidence to argue that the two forms of requirements were actually alike in effort.
However, the evidence clearly did not support the argument that Chapter 14/15 requirements
take less effort than do Chapter 6 requirements. Two insights can be drawn from the evidence:
1. Ignoring whether or not a requirement is designated a KPP or KSA, industry does not
differentiate between requirements from the various chapters of CDDs. Since KPPs and
KSAs only come from Chapter 6, unfair emphasis may be being placed on these
requirements over the requirements of Chapters 14/15.
2. Future cost estimation efforts based on early requirements must include consideration of
effort related to Chapter 14/15 requirements. If those requirements are incomplete or
unavailable, every effort should be made to complete or improve them.
4.3 Example Application of COSYSMO for HSI
The work presented thus far in this thesis has explored basic methods for and assumptions about
modeling the cost of HSI. This section demonstrates the relevance of the research provided by
walking through potential uses of the COSYSMO model, with HSI taken into consideration. For
brevity, only the elements needed to understand how HSI can be counted in the model are
discussed; for a more in-depth discussion of COSYSMO and its function, see (Valerdi 2008).
4.3.1 Step 1: Assess scope and purpose of estimation
COSYSMO requires three types of inputs in order to produce a useful cost estimate. Before the
scope of estimation can be established, the availability of these inputs must be assessed.
1. Calibration data
COSYSMO is calibrated using data from large defense contractors working mostly on aerospace
programs. Follow-on research has shown that organizations that use COSYSMO with local data
calibrations achieve more useful estimates. If historical data is not available either because it
was not kept or because no systems similar enough to the system being estimated exist, then
COSYSMO should be used as an analysis and planning tool only, not as a cost estimation model.
2. Size Drivers
Size drivers include requirements, interfaces, algorithms and operational scenarios. The cost
estimator should look at what types of documents describing these drivers already exist. The
level of detail to which the drivers are expressed in these documents will determine how precise
the resulting cost estimate will be. If the system is expressed using multiple types of size drivers,
say, requirements as well as interfaces, both may be used. However, if the documents overlap,
the size driver described in greatest detail should be used in order to avoid double counting.
3. Effort multipliers
Two types of effort multipliers are applied in COSYSMO: team factors and application factors.
Team factors are driven by the stakeholders involved in a system's development, whereas
application factors depend on the specific system being designed. Both these types of effort
multipliers are set by ratings assigned by a principle stakeholder or group of stakeholders. The
availability of data for effort multipliers therefore depends on the existence of experts who are
qualified to provide ratings and the reliability of those experts.
Understanding the availability and detail of the data sources above help to define the scope and
usefulness of applying COSYSMO. For example, if an estimate is needed early in acquisition,
usually only a draft requirements document will be available. If the prime contractor has not yet
been finalized, then many of the effort multipliers will not yet be applicable. In such a case,
COSYSMO might be applied as an early sensitivity analysis tool, rather than as a way to finalize
budgets. If, on the other hand, COSYSMO were to be applied by contractors preparing
proposals for a program, the tool could be used to compare plans and budgets at a detailed level.
4.3.2 Step 2: Collect and interpret data
It is best to collect the inputs described in the previous section consecutively: first calibration
data, then size drivers, and finally cost drivers.
The majority of the work described in this thesis pertains to the collection and analysis of the
size driver "number of requirements." As such, this section will describe the step-by-step
process of applying the findings in this thesis to a nominal cost estimation effort.
Assume the system-of-interest is an aircraft engine, similar to the one described in the case study
in 3.2. The only available source of size drivers is a draft requirements document, written at the
level of the aircraft. This means that the requirements pertinent to the engine must be identified.
This work corresponds to counting rules 1 and la. of requirements counting, as illustrated in
Figure 32.
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Figure 32. Counting rules 1 and L.a.
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Once the requirements relevant to the system of interest have been identified, they must be
checked for quality. Requirements drive systems engineering effort, but only if there is a clear
understanding of what systems engineers must do in response to a requirement.
Therefore, the next step to counting requirements asks whether the requirement being analyzed
can be verified or designed. If neither is true, then there is not a clear association between the
requirement and resulting systems engineering effort, so action must be taken before the
requirement can be input into the model. The flowchart in Figure 33 shows several possible
courses of action.
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Figure 33. Counting rule 2.
The best way to deal with a requirement that cannot be verified or designed is to engage the
stakeholder and refine the requirement or elicit a new one. However, this is often not possible.
The next best option is to decompose or derive the requirement into equivalent requirements
relevant to the system of interest that can be verified or designed.
If the requirement cannot be derived or decomposed, then a level of risk or uncertainty should be
associated with it. The work described in section 4.2.5.1 on consensus building is most relevant
here. As described in section 3.3.2.4, nonfunctional requirements (like HSI requirements) are
often written in ways such that it is unclear how they might be verified or designed. It was
shown that the Wideband Delphi method could be used with diverse stakeholders to provide a
rough estimate of risk associated with a requirement's expected effort. This method could be
applied at this stage to either enter an estimated requirements count into COSYSMO, or to
generate a quantitative argument for refining or re-elicit stakeholder requirements.
The last option presented in Figure 33, to omit the requirement altogether, is the worst option.
This is not to say that a cost estimator might be inclined to delete the requirement from the
requirements document, or even to count its effort as being equal to "0". Instead, cost estimators
may be tempted to count requirements that cannot be verified or designed as one requirement.
As captured in the workshops documented in both section 4.1 and section 4.2, requirements can
be associated with very different levels of effort. While COSYSMO does offer the opportunity
to assess the complexity of requirements later on in the requirements counting process, earlier
analysis gives more fidelity to the estimate.
As discussed in section 3.3.2.4, nonfunctional requirements often result in derived requirements
at the level of the system of interest. Nonfunctional requirements might be expressed at the same
time as functional requirements. However, they are often imposed as constraints on a system
after functional requirements or KPPs have already been defined. In any situation, nonfunctional
requirements must be analyzed to determine what requirements should be derived. After
completing counting rules 1 and 2, the cost estimator should analyze how nonfunctional
requirements of the system can be expected to affect the requirements of the system. The
example in Figure 34 shows a notional example of how HSI considerations that might be found
in nonfunctional requirements could impact an existing set of requirements.
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Figure 34. Counting rules 3, 3.a., and 3.b.
The analysis of nonfunctional/HSI requirements should result in a set of relevant decomposed or
derive requirements. These requirements should then be analyzed using counting rules 1 and 2,
as suggested by counting rule 3.b.
If the preceding steps for requirements counting have been followed correctly, then the cost
estimator should be able to simply add up the resulting number of requirements and input that
value into COSYSMO. Any estimates or equivalencies created as part of counting rule 2,
described above, should be included in the requirement tally as necessary.
With a total set of properly counted requirements, COSYSMO provides an estimate of the
systems engineering effort needed to achieve the requirements. In order to calculate the HSI
effort needed on a system, a number of approaches should be considered. The diagram in Figure
35 illustrates one simple approach.
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Figure 35. Counting rules 4 and 5.
A rough estimate of HSI effort can be arrived at by labeling requirements with the domain(s) of
HSI they apply to. Not only can an estimate of HSI effort be made in this way, but so can
estimates for the amount of effort that will be required by sub-organizations responsible for each
HSI domain. Whether or not a requirement pertains to a particular HSI domain can be
determined in one of two ways: (1) expert opinion and (2) keyword analysis.
Expert opinion is already used informally to identify relevant domains of HSI within IPTs.
Expert opinion can also be captured using formal methods, such as with a Wideband Delphi.
Keyword analysis to identify relevant HSI domains has been successfully applied in previous
research projects (711th Human Performance Wing 2008). The HSIRequirements Pocket Guide
lists HSI keywords in chapter 8 (Air Force Human Systems Integration Office 2009b).
The methods described above do not assume that HSI should be the sole purview of any one
"HSI organization" or delegated to lower-level organizations. Interviews with Pratt and Whitney
engineers as well as with participants from the two workshops used in this thesis indicated that
while an HSI organization or team did often exist within a company, that group was seldom the
only organization responsible for HSI. Therefore, the results of a requirements analysis should
not necessarily be used to fund specific organizations or an HSI team, but rather should give an
indication to key decision-makers the amount of effort that will be needed to achieve key HSI
results, regardless of what team carries out that work.
Complexity, reuse, and volatility are not specifically addressed in this thesis. However, a
distinction should be emphasized here between the application of the Wideband Delphi method
to assess complexity and the method in which it was applied for Workshop 2.
Although complexity ultimately corresponds to increased effort in COSYSMO, it would be
wrong for an estimator to think of complexity weightings in terms of "effort added." For
example, if a requirement seems difficult, the decision to assign it a difficulty rating should not
be based on the question "will realizing this requirement cost me more effort?" but rather on the
question "does this requirement match the definition of a 'difficult' requirement?" The
definitions of different complexity levels are discussed in section 3.3.1.2.
If complexity ratings were to be assigned based purely on a cost estimator's perception of effort,
two problems would arise: (1) the cost estimator would be able to introduce too much bias into
the estimate, and (2) there would be no clear way to track why one requirement was labeled
"difficult" and another "nominal."
4.3.3 Step 3: Consider team and application factors
Once a final list of requirements has been reached, effort multipliers need to be assessed in order
to address factors unique to an organization or program. The definition and assignment of effort
multipliers is covered in (Valerdi 2008). Unique issues that arise with effort multipliers related
to HSI and requirements are addressed here.
Consider the application of COSYSMO to a notional system. The system is defined by 200 easy,
200 nominal, and 100 difficult requirements, as shown in Figure 36. Assuming all effort
multipliers are assessed to be nominal, the program will require about 300 person-months of
systems engineering effort to complete.
Now consider that a high maintainability requirement was designated a KPP by the primary
stakeholder. Although the impact of this KPP on decomposed requirements has already been
captured, KPPs can increase awareness, tracking, and focus across on an issue across a program.
Therefore, it is decided that a high rating should be assigned to the "level of service requirements"
effort multiplier. Next, it is noted that sophisticated modeling tools are needed to perform HSI-
related safety and occupational health analyses. However, a review of potential tools reveals a
lack of suitable candidates. The decision is therefore made to decrease the value of the "tool
support" effort multiplier, but only in relation to safety- and occupational health- related
requirements. Screenshots from the academic version of COSYSMO illustrating this process are
shown in Figure 36 and Figure 37. Academic COSYSMO is available at cosysmo.mit.edu.
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Figure 36. COSYSMO example original estimate (Fortune 2009).
If all effort multipliers are left at nominal, the corresponding effort is calculated to be 303
person-months.
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Figure 37. Estimate taking into account HSI considerations (Fortune 2009).
Figure 37 shows how the level of service requirements and tools support can affect an effort
estimate. By increasing level of service requirements to high, the total effort estimate increases
to 399.7 person-months from 303.0. This effort multiplier is assessed over the program's entire
body of requirements, but the tools support effort multiplier should only be applied to safety and
occupational health requirements. Assume that there are 20 nominal and 20 difficult
safety/occupational health requirements. In order to calculate the impact of very low tools
support on just these requirements, 20 nominal and 20 difficult requirements are input into the
model. The level of service requirements is set to high. The tools support effort multiplier is
then varied between nominal and very low, and the impact on effort is compared. Applying this
process results in an increased effort of 18 person-months.
The processes described in this section can be tailored to fit a particular organization's business
practices. For example, in one company safety might be its own engineering group while in
another it might be split into sub-groups. Effort multipliers can be made to apply only to certain
sets of requirements, as necessary. It is important to keep in mind, however, that as the focus of
estimation changes, calibration data must also be adjusted.
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4.3.4 Step 4: Evaluate estimate and iterate
The power of cost estimation often comes not from the number generated by a model, but the
process through which the estimate is reached. The production of a cost estimate forces
estimators to seek out and validate sources of data. The results of cost estimation may highlight
program risks or and ambiguity. Cost estimates should not be considered a tool for producing a
static budget, but rather a vehicle for communication. Cost estimates must be performed
iteratively, for variables can and do change.
This chapter highlighted some of the key ways in which HSI can affect systems engineering cost
and shows how a parametric cost estimation tool like COSYSMO can translate those impacts
into relative differences in cost. It also draws attention to the importance of understanding
systems engineering requirements and their decomposition. The next chapter offers some
concluding thoughts and provides guidelines for future development.
5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary of Methods and Results
Figure 38 summarizes the methodology followed in this thesis, showing how initial research
questions and hypotheses motivated the work done.
Research Questions
R1. How can the "right" amount of effort to invest in HSI be determined?
R2. How much does HSI effort cost?
R3. What is the relationship between HSI and systems engineering?
Hypothesis
H1. HSI effort can be estimated as a function oftotal Systems Engineering Effort.
H2: HSI effort can be estimated by counting "number of HSI-related
requirements"
Figure 38. Thesis structure.
As summarized in section 1.2.1, the research was initiated by a set of research questions and an
initial hypothesis, represented as Ri, R2, R3, and Hi. These research questions and hypothesis
informed the problem formulation phase, during which a sub-hypothesis, H2, was generated. H2
emphasizes the importance of requirements counting for effort estimation. It informed the inputs
introduced into existing requirements counting rules, described in section 4.1.6.2.
The implementation and validation phase described the testing of the proposed changes to
requirements counting. The research question for Workshop 1 was informed by the conclusions
of the case study. The conclusions drawn from Workshop 1 then informed the research question
developed for Workshop 2. The conclusions from both workshops informed an example
application of COSYSMO for HSI, described in section 4.3.
At each point in this research, work done was motivated by the overarching hypotheses and
research questions. Figure 39 illustrates how conclusions generated during each phase
contributed to these initial objectives.
Research Questions Hypothesis
R1. How can the "right" amount ofeffort to invest in HSI be determined? H1. HSI effort can be estimated as a function oftotal Systems Engineering Effort.
R2. How much does HSI effort eventually cost? 112: HSI effort can be estimated by counting "number ofHSI-related
R3. What is the relationship between HSI and systems engineering? requirements"
Figure 39. Linking conclusions to research questions and hypotheses.
The following sections describe how work done for this research has supported each of the initial
research questions and hypotheses.
5.1.1 R1: How can the "right" amount of effort to invest in HSI be determined?
How can a program manager guarantee HSI considerations will be adequately addressed in a
program, without putting an unnecessary burden on budget? In this research, the case study of
the F 119 showed that requirements drive contractor effort, both in terms of specific deliverables
and in terms of high-level focus. In addition, it showed that requirements must be established
early on to make a lasting impact. The two workshops highlighted the different ways in which
stakeholders interpret requirements. Workshop 2 in particular emphasized the need to better
account for the impact of nonfunctional and HSI-related requirements. Therefore, the question
of how best to determine the "right" amount of HSI effort deals not with a dollar amount, but
with engineering the "right" requirements early on in development. For example, cost models
like COSYSMO will be able to provide an accurate estimate of HSI effort needed, but only if
that estimate is based on the "right" inputs.
5.1.2 R2: How much does HSI effort cost?
The F 119 case study showed that HSI effort could not be isolated from systems engineering
effort after the fact. The example application of COSYSMO for HSI in section 4.3 shows how
HSI effort can be estimated. The question of how much HSI costs depends largely on how HSI
is organized within an organization. What engineering group carries out HSI-related
requirements? How is systems engineering carried out in the organization? Requirements
engineering and COSYSMO can be used in conjunction to estimate the effort related to HSI in
the context of systems engineering as a whole. How that effort is carried out and how budgets
are assigned depends on the specific organization using the model.
5.1.3 R3: What is the relationship between HSI and systems engineering?
The F 119 case study showed one example of how HSI was tied into systems engineering
planning and practice. Workshop 2 showed that HSI considerations can exist in a variety of
types of requirements that span systems engineering. Review of literature showed that many
sources of systems engineering guidance already include mention of the human as a critical part
of the system. From its creation, HSI was meant to be a part of systems engineering. Successful
HSI depends greatly on successful systems engineering, and the inverse is also true.
5.1.4 Hypotheses: HSI as a function of systems engineering requirements
The workshops conducted as part of the implementation and validation work done for this thesis
challenged participants to apply a cost estimation methodology to the estimation of HSI effort.
The insights gained from those workshops were integrated into the cost model. Workshop 1
established a need to better account for nonfunctional requirements. Workshop 2 showed that
HSI-related requirements and nonfunctional requirements could be counted effectively using
COSYSMO counting rules. Section 4.3 gave an example of how the modified counting rules
could be used to accommodate even difficult or hard-to-understand HSI requirements. As
discussed above, HSI effort should not be considered as a single process of systems engineering
or as a discipline separate from systems engineering. Rather, HSI touches all aspects of systems
engineering, and any effort estimate for HSI must take into account how systems engineering is
carried out on the program being estimated.
The work done in this thesis therefore supports both the fact that HSI effort can be estimated by
counting requirements related to HSI and that HSI effort can be measured as a function of
systems engineering effort.
5.2 Limitations and Future Work
The one case study described in this thesis explores work that was completed in 1991. While it
proved valuable for formulating the research performed in the second half of the thesis, it does
not represent a broad sampling of how HSI is currently performed in industry. Gerst and Rhodes
(2010) have documented the perceptions of industry and government on HSI in ongoing work
that seeks to integrate HSI into systems engineering leading indicators. Elm et al. (2008)
surveyed major government contractors and subcontractors to a better understanding of systems
engineering return on investment. Performing similar research specifically investigating HSI
would be difficult due to varied definitions of HSI and HSI domains. Future work should
investigate HSI practices at a larger sample of organizations in order to generate best practices
and so better inform future cost estimation research.
The two workshops conducted during implementation and validation were both limited by the
number and diversity of available participants. The benefit of gathering data from the workshops
was that attendees tended to have advanced experience in systems engineering and cost
estimation. However, there was no way to randomly sample. As such, no statistical conclusions
could be drawn about the broader population. General conclusions could be arrived at if the
insights generated from the workshops conducted in this research were used to develop survey
questions that could be distributed to a larger sample of HSI and systems engineering
practitioners.
Workshop 2 in particular applied the Wideband Delphi method and showed that consensus was
generated between rounds. However, it was unclear whether the estimates participants agreed on
would have been the same estimates a different group of participants would have agreed on.
Performing the workshop on different groups of participants would increase the strength of the of
the estimates arrived at.
5.3 Impact on Policy
The objective of this research was to explore research questions related to the cost of HSI.
However, estimating the investment needed upfront to enable HSI practice tells only one part of
the story. Understanding HSI effort needed early on enables decisions that allow for programs to
finish on budget and schedule, while delivering performance to users. This section proposes
three ways in which policy can be modified to support these goals.
5.3.1 Mandate Early Systems Engineering Cost Estimate
Section 2.1.1 gives an overview of the Defense Acquisition System. An AoA is one of the first
documents that must be completed at the outset of acquisition. AoA's are performed during the
MSA phase, prior to milestone A. They compare the costs and operational effectiveness of
different means of achieving the desired capability.
Section 3.3 of the Defense Acquisition Guide provides the most detailed guidance on how to
prepare an AoA (Defense Acquisition University 2010a). Cost estimates created for the AoA
must take into account total life cycle costs. The DAG suggests several ways to estimate costs.
The goal of the cost analysis in an AoA is to look broadly at the cost of a system across
development, procurement, and operations & sustainment.
Systems engineering budget has historically been associated with between 10 and 20% of a
system's development budget (RAND Corporation 2006). Other work has shown that RDT&E
makes up roughly 2% of the total cost of a system, while procurement makes up roughly 34%
(Louden 2000). Given these figures, the natural conclusion would be that systems engineering
budget makes up a very small fraction of the total budget of most systems. Since AoA cost
analyses are performed very early on in acquisition, systems engineering costs can be difficult to
estimate with precision. Early cost estimators tend to focus their efforts on what is in their minds
the largest drivers of cost - hardware, software, and manpower. Systems engineering, is
however, planned early on. A Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) is due at Milestone A and is
continually revised through Milestone B. The existence of this document contributes to the
impression that a cost estimate for systems engineering is not needed in the AoA.
The assumption that hardware, software, and manpower are the major drivers of a program's cost
is wrong for two reasons. First, the bulk of systems engineering costs are associated with
RDT&E and procurement budgets, which have been shown to make up roughly a third of total
ownership costs. However, these numbers are based on completed, successful projects. Many
projects in defense are never completed, often due to failures in management of budget and
schedule, directly related to systems engineering.
The rule of thumb for RDT&E spending on a project is 2% of total life cycle costs. However,
projected fiscal year 2010 RDT&E costs made up 12% of the DoD's acquisition budget (taking
into account RDT&E, Procurement, O&M and personnel costs) (Department of Defense 2009).
Add to this fact that systems engineering decisions made upfront drive.costs later acquisition (as
argued by the General Accounting Office (2003), and in the case study described in section 3.2),
and it becomes clear that systems engineering should not be excluded from cost estimates
conducted during the AoA.
Mandating a systems engineering cost estimate during the AoA will accomplish three main
objectives:
1. Force early analysis of systems engineering and HSI issues
2. Create better link between AoA, SEP, HSIP, and Cost Analysis Requirements
Description (CARD)
3. Prevent cutting budget from systems engineering/HSI activities
Although this recommendation argues that cost estimation must be done for systems engineering,
it also directly addresses the HSI. Since HSI is tightly coupled with SE, the benefits of
conducting early cost analysis for systems engineering will by necessity also consider HSI issues,
as outlined in section 4.3.
5.3.2 Better Integrate HSI into SE Training and Guidance
Systems engineering as discipline started because challenges faced in Defense Acquisition
required traditional engineers to consider how different fields of engineering contributed to the
performance of an overarching system. The first systems engineers were trained engineers from
traditional fields who applied their engineering skills to systems challenges (Ferris 2007). In
many ways, the development of HSI has closely followed the systems engineering model.
While human-related considerations have long played a part in systems acquisition, the
complexity of modem systems requires a systems-thinking approach.
Similar to how mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, and software engineers became
systems engineers by necessity as systems engineering demands increased, so have trained
Human Factors engineers, safety engineers, and the like begun to put on an HSI "hat" as program
managers have asked for this expertise. Likewise, as attention has grown on HSI, organizations
have been stood up to advocate for and manage HSI within programs. While having a central
advocate for HSI promotes awareness throughout each service and ensure HSI issues are
addressed on major programs, no one organization is capable of conducting the reviews
necessary to ensure thorough HSI practice throughout all programs.
The approaches toward HSI dictated by policy do not correlate to current execution. DoD policy
states that the objective of HSI is to "optimize total system performance [and] minimize total
ownership costs" while systems engineering must "balance system performance, cost, schedule,
and risk" (Department of Defense 2008a). Likewise, the Defense Acquisition Guide states that
"the program manager should integrate system requirements for the HSI domains with each other,
and also with the total system" and goes on to emphasize the inclusion of HSI on IPTs within
integrated product and process development (IPPD) (Defense Acquisition University 201 Oa). If,
however, HSI "practitioners" or "experts" are likely, as described above, to be rooted in one of
the domains of HSI, it seems unlikely a single HSI advocate on an IPT could fully address the
myriad issues that arise when integrating humans into system requirements.
From the perspective of the systems engineer, HSI training is insufficient. HSI-related
requirements continue to be discussed in the same breath as nonfunctional requirements and
"other DOTMLPF" considerations (CJCS 2009). Basic training for requirements managers
within DoD adopt this guidance as well; the chapter on systems engineering makes one mention
of HSI and other mentions of HSI again consider as part of nonfunctional requirements.
The result of current policy on HSI and systems engineering is that despite the fact that HSI
essentially exists to integrate human considerations into systems engineering, stovepipes are
being formed where "HSI practitioners" are not necessarily systems engineers and systems
engineers may not have the skills necessary to fully consider HSI impacts.
The work reported in this thesis has illustrated how important though difficult it is to analyze
requirements early in development. In order to adequately consider HSI issues early, HSI must
become a mandatory part of basic systems engineering training. Systems engineers are
responsible for system integration; it follows that they, not a solely HSI-specific practitioner,
should be responsible for the integration of human considerations into systems. This is not to
say that a training module on HSI should be developed and distributed. Such an approach would
be too easily ignored. Without context, the domains of HSI are complex and can be abstract.
Instead, it is recommended that HSI should be written into existing systems engineering
guidance. The Air Force HSI Office has developed a detailed document explaining where HSI
can be inserted into systems engineering throughout life cycle processes (Air Force Human
Systems Integration Office 2009a). It is recommended that similar HSI considerations should be
integrated into guidelines for the SEP and the Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP).
Currently, guidance for preparation of these documents makes no mention of HSI (Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Systems and Software
Engineering/Enterprise Development 2008).
These recommendations to enhance integration of HSI into systems engineering guidance and
training do not negate the need for HSI experts. Just as some systems will need dedicated
Human Factors engineers, safety engineers, environmental engineers, and the like, so will some
systems need to have HSI experts on staff. Existing efforts to ensure development of an HSI
Plan (HSIP) early in acquisition should continue. The argument, therefore, is not that existing
efforts are wrong, only that more can be done in systems engineering practice to ensure
successful HSI.
5.4 Conclusion
This research sought to explore the cost of HSI effort within acquisition programs. The goal of
the research was to integrate HSI into a systems engineering cost model in order to give decision
makers an accurate picture of expected HSI effort. A case study and two workshops led to
significant contributions to an existing systems engineering cost model that will enable better
capture of HSI considerations.
The path of this research has also highlighted many other insights relevant to the practice of HSI.
HSI has been championed in a number of high-level policy documents. Many case studies have
shown how relatively small investments in HSI have resulted in significant savings. However,
HSI continues to be considered a challenge to implement.
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Understanding HSI costs is not important only the generation of a cost model. In a culture where
program managers are solely responsible for the cost and schedule of their systems, the value of
HSI must be expressed in terms of cost in order to garner adequate attention. As HSI is tightly
coupled to systems engineering, early estimates for systems engineering cost must be made, so
that these costs are understood and planned for early by program managers. Program managers
must understand the level of investment they need to make in HSI, the benefits it will provide,
and the activities that must be done to enable successful HSI.
Part of what this research has done is to show that in order to understand HSI costs, one must
first understand the impact of HSI in requirements. Requirements drive system development,
and therefore the majority of development costs. As requirements are a fundamental part of
systems engineering practice, systems engineers must be better trained to recognize HSI issues
early in the requirements engineering process. Better integration of HSI into systems
engineering will help program managers understand the work that must be completed to achieve
HSI. Only then will systems engineers, working together with HSI and HSI domain experts, be
able to define affordable systems that deliver value to warfighters.
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7 APPENDICES
7.1 Workshop 1 Handouts
24th International Forum on COCOMO and Systems/Software Cost
Modeling
COSYSMO Workshop
Exercise: "COSYSMO for HSI"
Thank you for participating in this exercise as part of the COSYSMO workshop session. Your time and
input is much appreciated. Please follow along on these handouts as the presenter goes through the
corresponding slides.
First, the Basics:
Name: Email:
Affiliation:
What is your familiarity with Systems Engineering?
None Some familiarity Extensive
Please describe:
What is your familiarity with Requirements Management/Engineering?
None Some familiarity Extensive
Please describe:
What is your familiarity with Requirements Decomposition?
None Some familiarity Extensive
Please describe:
What is your familiarity with the Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model (COSYSMO)?
First exposure | Heard of it, never used I Used briefly I Used extensively I Helped to develop it
Please describe:
What is your familiarity with Human Systems Integration?
Please describe:
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Part 1: Determine the System of Interest
#1: Too High
Comments:
#2: Too High
Comments:
#3: Too High
Comments:
#4: Too High
Comments:
#5: Too High
Comments:
#6: Too High
Comments:
#7: Too High
Comments:
#8: Too High
Comments:
| Sea-Level I Too Low
I Sea-Level I Too Low
I Sea-Level Too Low
Sea-Level | Too Low
I Sea-Level | Too Low
I Sea-Level | Too Low
| Sea-Level I Too Low
Applying Cockburn's Use Case
Hierarchy:
"Sea-level" use cases are tasks
where the user "makes their
money".
High:
"Deliver quality product to Client"
Sea-level:
"Develop monthly reports for
client".
Low:
"Log into workstation"
Now think of the system being
designed as a "user". How does
the system "make its money"?
Hints:
If it is lower, what higher-level
requirement could be used to
capture this concept for the glass
console?
If it is higher, what derived
requirement(s) would capture this
requirement's intent at the level of
the glass console?
Ifyou can't answer these
questions, perhaps the level of
interest is actually correct!
I Sea-Level | Too Low
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Part 2: Can the System be tested, verified, OR designed?
#1: Comments:
#2: Comments:
#3: Comments:
#4: Comments:
#5: Comments:
#6: Comments:
#7: Comments:
#8: Comments:
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Hints
If you have to decompose the
requirement in order to be able to
test, verify, or design it, then the
answer is no.
Does the requirement depend on
factors outside system boundaries?
What is the test?
How would you design the
requirement?
Is the requirement too vague?
Part 3: Do these Reiuirements have an HSI Impact on the System-of-
Interest?
#1: None | One requirement
Comments:
#2: None | One requirement
Comments:
#3: None One requirement
Comments:
#4: None
Comments:
#5: None
Comments:
#6: None
Comments:
#7: None
Comments:
#8: None
Comments:
One requirement
One requirement
One requirement
One requirement
One requirement
I Many requirements
| Many requirements
| Many requirements
| Many requirements
| Many requirements
Many requirements
| Many requirements
| Many requirements
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HSI requirements include, but
are not limited to, any
requirement pertaining to one or
more domains of HSI, or the
integration of those domains.
Broadly, the term encompasses
any requirement that
contributes to the integration
of human considerations into
the system being developed.
Commonly recognized HSI
domains:
Manpower
Personnel
Training
Human Factors Engineering
Ergonomics
Survivability
Safety
Occupational Health
Habitability
ESOH
Health Hazards
Environment
Workshop 1 Phase 1
Cautions and Warnings. Method for displaying system warnings, cautions, and alarms must be
appropriate given the importance of the situation (Threshold).
Timeliness and Accuracy of Information. The glass console will present accurate and timely
data from many important systems to the driver. The console must detect data errors and display
an error message instead of incorrect information (threshold). An error message must be
displayed if the system detects a lag of greater than (threshold=20ms, objective=2ms)
User Interface. The user must be able to interact with the console using either touch or voice
(threshold).
Response Time. User must be able to perceive and process all information displayed by console
in under (threshold=20ms, objective=2ms).
Map Readability. Maps displayed for the GPS function of the console shall be readable with
20/20 vision at 1 meter (threshold).
Emergency Override. In the case that the console receives an emergency interrupt from vehicle
sensors, it shall display the appropriate emergency caution, alarm, or alert in under
(threshold=2ms)
Data Redundancy. All sensors built into the vehicle must provide a copy of its output to the
glass console for possible integration into alerts, alarms, or cautions (threshold).
Speech Displays. If the console is to employ computer-generated speech to communicate with
the driver, speech rate must not exceed 150 wpm (threshold)
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Workshop 1 Phase 2
Cautions and Warnings. Method for displaying system warnings, cautions, and alarms must be
appropriate given the importance of the situation (Threshold).
Response Time. The driver must be able to perceive and process all information displayed by
console in under (threshold=20ms, objective=2ms).
Display Contrast. All text displayed by the glass console must have a contrast ratio of
(objective=5000: 1, threshold= 1000:1), defined as the ANSI standard contrast ratio in an ideal
room.
Display Reliability. The glass console must not fail due to electrical malfunction within the
lifetime of an average vehicle (assume 10 years) (threshold).
Mitigation of Divided Attention. The driver shall be able to operate all aspects of the glass
console without having a measurable impact upon driving performance (threshold).
Console Startup/Shutdown Times. The glass console must be available for the driver to
interface with within (objective=2s, threshold=5s) of the beginning of the ignition sequence.
The glass console must be in a low-power or standby state within (threshold=Os) of vehicle
power-off.
Function Execution. The driver must be able to perform any single task (menu selection, radio
station switching) in under (threshold=5 s)
Data Integration. All displays within the glass console shall use a standard set of buttons and
labels to improve intuitiveness (threshold)
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Workshop 1 Phase 3
Timeliness and Accuracy of Information. The glass console will present accurate and timely
data from many important systems to the driver. The console must detect data errors and display
an error message instead of incorrect information (threshold). An error message must be
displayed if the system detects a lag of greater than (threshold=20ms, objective=2ms)
Temperature Control. The inside temperature must remain within 2 degrees Celsius of the
desired temperature set by the driver during normal driving conditions (threshold).
Passenger Safety. In the case of a front or side-impact collision at speed over 80 mph, but under
100mph, chance of survival for all passengers must be greater than 95%, given an average adult
male or female (threshold).
Documentation. All manuals/documentation for the vehicle will include all information
necessary to operate the vehicle in a safe and effective way (threshold).
Air Quality. Air quality must be maintained to standards as set forth in QLT-STD-1234
(threshold). In the case that air quality degrades below these standards, appropriate alarms or
alerts shall warn the driver (threshold).
Maintenance Time. All minor to medium-level vehicle maintenance tasks shall take no longer
than (objective=lhr, threshold=2hrs) to complete.
Ambient Light. All displays must function to identical performance characteristics in low light
as well as direct sunlight (threshold).
Console Startup/Shutdown Times. The glass console must be available for the driver to
interface with within (objective=2s, threshold=5s) of the beginning of the ignition sequence.
The glass console must be in a low-power or standby state within (threshold=Os) of vehicle
power-off.
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7.2 Workshop 2 Handouts
COSYSMO Workshop
Exercise: "COSYSMO for HSI"
Thank you for participating in this exercise as part of the COSYSMO workshop session. Your
time and input is much appreciated.
First, the Basics:
Name:
Email:
Affiliation:
What is your familiarity with Systems Engineering?
First exposure I Heard of it I Trained | Experienced Expert
What is your familiarity with Requirements Management/Engineering?
First exposure I Heard of it | Trained I Experienced | Expert
What is your familiarity with Requirements Decomposition?
First exposure | Heard of it | Trained | Experienced I Expert
What is your familiarity with the Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model
(COSYSMO)?
First exposure | Heard of it | Trained I Experienced I Expert
What is your familiarity with Human Factors/Human Factor Engineering?
First exposure I Heard of it I Trained I Experienced | Expert
What is your familiarity with Human Systems Integration?
First exposure | Heard of it I Trained I Experienced I Expert
Additional Comments:
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Example of a nominal requirement
Threshold: Operators shall be able to read the XX display (where XX display is the system
being designed) during day and night, with no visible signature at night from 10-50m. Device
must enable operators to keep head up while reading data on computer.
Requirements to be judged
1. Threshold: When employing proper escape/evasion and camouflage/concealment techniques, the
XX will have a visible signature with less than a 10% probability of detection at 328 ft (100m)
with the unaided eye, optical magnification, and NV devices.
2. Threshold: Hands-on training is required for 25 personnel at the centralized weather organizations
to operation and maintain XX provided systems. For external users, the contractor is required to
develop computer based training modules for all external services. Objective 50 personnel
3. The maintainer will be able to complete maintenance corrective actions within (T=30, 0=10)
minutes
4. The operating altitudes of the XX (platform) will be above all small arms threats and smaller
caliber light AAA threats. The modification package (this CDD) shall detect, provide avoidance
recommendation, and/or counter all anticipated threats in a low threat environment (e.g. small
arms, light AAA, & MANPADS) while maintaining a persistent, tactically responsive presence
over the area of operations, day or night. Finally, the modification package will enhance the
donor aircraft's survivability with standoff posture through Sensor Capabilities and SOPGM
5. The system must be designed to eliminate or mitigate safety, health or physical risks. Where
hazards/risks exist, health and safety equipment and/or procedures must be identified. Health and
Safety procedures and engineering design considerations must conform to AF Operational and
Safety health standards. Crew task load, fatigue factors, broad range of operating environments,
and data assimilation must be considered.
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Example of a nominal reiuirement
Threshold: Operators shall be able to read the XX display (where XX display is the system
being designed) during day and night, with no visible signature at night from 10-50m. Device
must enable operators to keep head up while reading data on computer.
Requirements to be iud2ed
6. Personnel with the appropriate aptitudes, physical/mental abilities will be employed for the
system. In addition, human performance shall be optimized by assessing the workload and tasks
and ensuring that each crew member can accomplish the mission without experience task
saturation.
7. The system inspection concept shall be designed to maximize flying operations by aligning
scheduled inspections/maintenance intervals with donor aircraft.
8. The system will be required to operate in all environmental regions of the globe without
perceptible degradation in performance.
9. The system should have internally installed instrumentation interfaces to support testing and
training that is interoperable with existing and planned test and training systems. All electronic
tactical systems should have an automatic fault code recorder and tracking system to assist
maintenance personnel in maintenance and repair work.
10. Personnel shall be able to utilize the system as required while wearing the Mission Oriented
Protection Posture (MOPP) IV ensemble. The system must enable operators to perform tasks
while in MOPP IV ensembles and perform mission tasks in an operational environment.
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ANSWER SHEET - ROUND 1 (individual round)'
Example of a nominal requirement
Threshold: Operators shall be able to read the XX display (where XX display is the system
being designed) during day and night, with no visible signature at night from 10-50m. Device
must enable operators to keep head up while reading data on computer.
Compared to the nominal requirement, this requirement is how much more effort?
1. 1x 2x 4x 8x
2. lx 2x 4x 8x
3. lx 2x 4x 8x
4. 1x 2x 4x 8x
5. 1x 2x 4x 8x
6. 1x 2x 4x 8x
7. lx 2x 4x 8x
8. 1x 2x 4x 8x
9. lx 2x 4x 8x
10. lx 2x 4x 8x
Answer sheets for Rounds 2 and 3 were identical.
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Workshop 1 Phase 1
Cautions and Warnings. Method for displaying system warnings, cautions, and alarms must be
appropriate given the importance of the situation (Threshold).
Timeliness and Accuracy of Information. The glass console will present accurate and timely
data from many important systems to the driver. The console must detect data errors and display
an error message instead of incorrect information (threshold). An error message must be
displayed if the system detects a lag of greater than (threshold=20ms, objective=2ms)
User Interface. The user must be able to interact with the console using either touch or voice
(threshold).
Response Time. User must be able to perceive and process all information displayed by console
in under (threshold=20ms, objective=2ms).
Map Readability. Maps displayed for the GPS function of the console shall be readable with
20/20 vision at 1 meter (threshold).
Emergency Override. In the case that the console receives an emergency interrupt from vehicle
sensors, it shall display the appropriate emergency caution, alarm, or alert in under
(threshold=2ms)
Data Redundancy. All sensors built into the vehicle must provide a copy of its output to the
glass console for possible integration into alerts, alarms, or cautions (threshold).
Speech Displays. If the console is to employ computer-generated speech to communicate with
the driver, speech rate must not exceed 150 wpm (threshold)
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